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Crisis States Programme 
 
Urban Fault Lines in Shangri-La: Population and economic foundations of 
interethnic conflict in the Tibetan areas of Western China* 
Andrew Martin Fischer  
DESTIN, LSE  
 
 
This paper argues that contemporary experiences of social exclusion and interethnic conflict 
in the Tibetan areas of Western China are interrelated and revolve around three processes – 
population, growth and employment – all of which centre on the urban areas. In this setting, 
the critical factors generating exclusion and fuelling conflict are the differentials between 
groups, such as urbanisation rates and education levels, rather than base line characteristics, 
such as population shares or poverty levels. The paper starts with a brief overview of ethnic 
conflict in the Tibetan areas, followed by an analysis of population issues and the economic 
fundamentals of exclusionary growth. It closes with some reflections on the role that ethnic 




Masses of the Han race have been settled into Tibet, reducing the original Tibetans into a 
minority in their own land.  
Samdhong Rimpoche 
(Prime Minister of the Tibetan Government in Exile)1 
 
The subject of population generally frames popular analyses of conflict in the Tibetan areas of 
Western China. The reigning view in the Tibetan exile community – as well as among most 
western observers and even many Tibetans and Chinese within Tibet – contends that the Han, 
and to a lesser extent the Muslims, are quite simply overrunning Tibet, in a process that is 
typically referred to as ‘population swamping’ or ‘transfer’. This view has a basis that is 
partially valid, but only with respect to the Tibetan urban areas, where Han and Muslim 
migrants mostly congregate; it is only in the main strategic cities and towns where it can be 
truly argued that the Han are outnumbering the Tibetans. Ironically, the perception of 
population swamping is essentially an urban-centric assessment of ethnic shares in the 
population, even though the Tibetan areas remain some of the most rural in China.  
 
The economic foundations of immigration and exclusion in the Tibetan areas point to the 
legitimate concern that immigration might exacerbate economic exclusion among locals, even 
in the midst of rapid growth, although not because of swamping per se. Rather, exclusion 
operates through qualitative differences between migrants and locals. Out-of-province Han 
and Muslim migrants in the Tibetan areas emigrate from more competitive conditions and 
generally have much higher education and skill levels than local Tibetans. Hence, they enter 
                                                 
* The Crisis States Programme of the London School of Economics provided funding for field research in the 
summer 2003, which contributed to this paper. In addition, the paper has profited from current field visits in the 
winter 2003-2004, which have been funded by the Central Research Fund of the University of London. General 
PhD funding has also contributed indirectly to this work, which has been provided by the Québec Government 
(Fonds québecois de la recherche sur la société et la culture), the UK Government (Overseas Research Student 
Award), the London School of Economics, and the Canadian Section of Amnesty International. 
1 Surojit Mahalanobis, ‘Tibetans are a marginalised lot: The Samdhong Rimpoche Interview’, The Economic 
Times, 31 May 2003. 
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the host economy on a higher rung of the labour hierarchy than most locals, the educated local 
elite aside. This differs from other Chinese settings, or even many western settings, where the 
bulk of immigrants have usually entered through the bottom rungs of the hierarchy, such as 
rural migrants in coastal China, Hispanics in the US, Turkish guest workers in Germany, and 
so forth. Thus the contention surrounding immigration to the Tibetan areas is derived from the 
fact that non-Tibetan migrants are crowding out Tibetan rural migrants and the Tibetan urban 
poor from limited urban employment opportunities, precisely at a moment when growth is 
heavily biased towards the urban areas and local rural to urban migration is becoming an 
imperative.   
 
Within this perspective, the reigning views on population swamping, while probably 
misconceived, can be seen as a reactive lens through which locals interpret their experience of 
exclusion within urban growth. Indeed, the logic of peripheral development in the Tibetan 
areas, which are among the poorest regions of China, would tend to counter the thesis of 
population swamping. If anything, population outflow, particularly among the educated, is an 
important developmental constraint on these areas. Nonetheless, the symbiotic conflation of 
these two processes – migration and exclusion – provides the discursive superstructure 
through which Tibetans understand interethnic conflict, thereby providing a potent ground for 
action and for the development of nationalisms both within and outside Tibet.  
 
This paper will tackle these issues of exclusion and ethnic conflict in the Tibetan areas from a 
macro perspective. The underlying theoretical approach draws upon the analytical framework 
of social exclusion, as reformulated by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) over the past decade for application in the 
developing world.2 Here, three processes are examined in terms of how they influence both 
exclusion and perceptions of ethnic conflict: population dynamics, which deal mainly with the 
confluence of local population transitions and migration flows; economic growth; and 
employment, assessed through the lens of education and skill levels.   
 
The central tenet of the paper is that contemporary experiences of social exclusion and 
interethnic conflict in the Tibetan areas are interrelated and revolve around these three 
processes – population, growth and employment – all of which centre on processes of 
urbanisation, which in turn differentiates modern from historical confrontations. Furthermore, 
both exclusion and conflict are exacerbated by the nature of peripheral development and 
associated inequalities or structural transformations. In this setting, the critical factors 
generating exclusion and fuelling conflict are the differentials between groups, such as 
urbanisation rates and education levels, rather than base line characteristics, such as 
population shares or poverty levels.  
 
                                                 
2 For instance, Gerry Rodgers explains that “social exclusion… is seen as a way of analysing how and why 
individuals and groups fail to have access to or benefit from the possibilities offered by societies and 
economies”, particularly within the context of contemporary economic transformations (Gerry Rodgers, Charles 
Gore & José B. Figueiredo, (eds), Social Exclusion: Rhetoric Reality Responses, Geneva: International Labour 
Organisation, 1995, p.44). The appeal of such an approach is that it ties together a variety of related issues under 
one rubric, such as poverty, inequality, employment, marginality, exclusion (from the Western European 
perspective), underclass (from the US perspective), peripherality, entitlements, and agency. In particular, the 
ILO-UNDP approach emphasises the central role of “citizenship rights” and how these interact with 
development policy, generating either inclusion or exclusion (Rodgers, et al,, 1995, p.18). This is a particularly 
interesting angle for the far western regions of China, given the contested notions and practices of citizenship in 
these areas. See also José B. Figueiredo & Arjan de Haan, Social exclusion: an ILO perspective, Geneva: 
International Institute for Labour Studies, 1998. 
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Despite its popular status as an exception in the world – Shangri-La and its defilement by the 
Chinese Communists – the Tibetan case is actually quite typical of peripheral development in 
multi-ethnic situations, which refers to a context where the levers of economic and political 
power are centred outside the region and its dominant ethnic group. The tensions associated 
with development can be seen as resulting from the intensified integration of such peripheral 
regions into core regions, a process that is analogical to ‘globalisation’. Therefore, it is hoped 
that this study will also provide some general lessons for other world regions.     
 
The intention of this paper is to complement the growing wealth of related micro- level studies 
on the Tibetan areas. It is notable that despite the repeated invocation of population issues, 
very little comprehensive macro- level analysis of these dynamics and their relation to 
interethnic conflict in the Tibetan areas is available, both within and outside China.3 The 
paper employs both quantitative and qualitative analysis. The quantitative is derived entirely 
from official and publicly available Chinese statistical sources. Interestingly, although the 
exiles dispute many of these statistical sources due to the fact that they do not portray a 
massive inflow of Han migrants, the same sources clearly illustrate an experience of social 
exclusion among Tibetans. This will be supplemented by qualitative insights drawn from 
recent field visits to all three of the major Tibetan regions in China and from a variety of 
secondary literature from across the social sciences.  
 
The paper is divided into four sections. It opens with a brief historical overview of interethnic 
conflict in the Tibetan areas, focusing on two strands: Tibetan-Chinese and Tibetan-Muslim 
conflict. The second section delves into an aggregate analysis of population dynamics. The 
third outlines the foundations of exclusionary growth in the Tibetan areas, and then examines 
differential education levels as a means to understand the underlying factors influencing 
exclusion among both Tibetans and Muslims. The fourth section reflects on the interactions of 
exclusion and ethnic conflict in the Tibetan areas. 
 
Matrices of interethnic conflict in Tibet 
Historical roots 
Despite its Shangri-La image, pre-communist Tibet was a region of considerable contestation 
and conflict. In the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) – the area that was more or less under 
the dominion of Lhasa up to 1950 – conflict was mostly intra-ethnic, due to the fact that the 
area was essentially homogeneous in ethnicity up to this time. Generalised interethnic conflict 
in Central Tibet has therefore been new to the communist period. It relates mainly to the 
occupation and the consequent expansion of the Han-dominated state in this region. 4 
 
                                                 
3 Two exceptions published by western Tibet Support Groups in the mid-1990s are: Anders Hojmark Andersen, 
Sarah Cooke & Michael Wills, The New Majority, London: the Tibet Support Group, 1995; and Steven D. 
Marshall & Susette Ternent Cooke, Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation, Development 
with Chinese Characteristics, Washington, D.C.: The Alliance for Research in Tibet, 1997, p. 2560. These two 
studies, both of which support the thesis of population transfer, rely on data from the 1990 census and several 
population surveys in the early 1990s. They therefore do not deal with dynamics since the mid-1990s nor with 
the much higher quality population data available in the 2000 census. Several prominent Chinese scholars also 
produced a few population studies in the mid-1990s, such as Rong Ma, Xizang de renkou yu shehui (Population 
and Society of Tibet), Beijing: Tongxin Publishing House, 1996. Although Chinese scholars, both Tibetan and 
Han, are generally constrained by the political environment in China, much insight has been derived from their 
works and, in particular, from private conversations.  
4 For the history of Central Tibet from 1913 to 1951, see the groundbreaking work by Melvyn Goldstein, A 
History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951 , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. From 1947 to the 1990s, 
see Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows, London: Pimlico, 1999. 
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On the other hand, interethnic conflict has been much more deeply rooted in East and 
Northeast Tibet, known to the Tibetans as Kham and Amdo. In particular, Kham remains the 
region where the interface between Tibetans and Han Chinese has been the most violent, 
particularly since the Manchu acted to consolidate their direct rule over large parts of eastern 
Tibet in the early eighteenth century. Ever since, Kham has played an important role in 
generating a psyche among successive Chinese rulers that the empire/nation was vulnerable to 
destabilisation via its Tibetan backyard, thus requiring forceful subjugation. 5 In the southern 
parts of Kham, conflicts with the neighbouring Yi minority at times may have also been an 
issue, particularly when the power of certain Yi warlords in Yunnan was ascendant.6  
 
Conflict between Tibetans and Chinese Muslims has been most pronounced in Amdo, given 
that the region borders and even overlaps with important Muslim centres in the northwest of 
China. For instance, the Salar Muslims – a small group indigenous to Qinghai – are said to 
have settled as early as the thirteenth century in the Xunhua Salar Autonomous County 
(SAC), an area that hugs Rebkong, one of the cultural hearts of Amdo.7 Just across the border 
in Gansu, the Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture (HAP) is a main Hui Muslim hub that has 
been an important Sufi centre. Linxia town is in very close proximity to the extensive Labrang 
monastic complex (Ch. Xiahe), one of the main Tibetan religious centres of the region. 8  
 
This overlapping has involved both cooperative and conflictive dimensions. The cooperative 
has revolved around trade and certain specialised services in the Tibetan towns such as 
butchery, in which the Muslims have specialised for centuries.9 This has been underlain by 
competition and violent confrontations. Attention can be drawn to the Salar rebellion in the 
1860s, which the Manchu put down by using Tibetan armies.10 The rise to power of the 
Muslim warlord Ma Bufang in the 1930s and 1940s was centred in the Muslim counties 
mentioned above, and involved many confrontations with local Amdo Tibetans, including 
‘ethnic cleansing’ of Tibetans in several of these counties.11 It is quite likely that the current 
                                                 
5 For instance, see the detailed historical account of the two Jinchuan wars in the 18th century by Roger Greatrex, 
‘A Brief Introduction to the First Jinchuan War (1747-1749)’, in Per Kvaerne (ed.), Tibetan Studies: 
Proceedings of the 6th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Fagernes 1992 , Vol.1, Oslo: 
Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1994. For the first half of the 20th century, see William M. 
Coleman, ‘The Uprising at Batang: Khams and its significance in Chinese and Tibetan history’, in Lawrence 
Epstein (ed.), Khams pa Histories, Leiden: Brill, 2002, pp.31-55; Wim van Spengen, ‘Frontier History of 
Southern Kham: Banditry and war in the multi-ethnic fringe lands of Chatring, Mili, and Gyethang, 1890-1940’, 
in Epstein (2002), pp.7-29; and Peng Wenbin, ‘Frontier Process, Provincial Politics and Movements for Khampa 
Autonomy during the Republican Period’, in Epstein (2002), pp. 57-84. 
6 For some mention of this in the 1920s and 1930s, see Peng (2002). 
7 David S. G. Goodman, ‘Qinghai and the Emergence of The West: Nationalities, communal interaction and 
national integration’, The China Quarterly, 178 (forthcoming, June 2004).  
8 See Paul Nietupski, ‘Sino-Tibetan Relations in Eighteenth-Century Labrang’, in Katia Buffetrille & Hildegard 
Diemberger (eds.), Territory and Identity in Tibet and the Himalayas, Leiden: Brill, 2002, pp.121-133. Labrang 
was founded in the early 18th century as a local power centre within a nexus of Tibetan, Mongolian and Qing 
patronage. Interestingly, the rise of Muslim influence and territorial claims for sovereignty, with Linxia as a 
focal point, were more or less contemporaneous to these Tibetan developments at Labrang. 
9 Generally, Linxia Muslim influence in the Tibetan areas extends back for centuries. Their trade routes have 
also been an influence in the development of many Tibetan towns, such as the Longwu Township in Rebkong 
(Ch. Tongren), one of the main cultural centres of Amdo. See Lin Yi, ‘Schooling and Cultural Citizenship in 
Multiethnic Northwest China: the Tibetan Case’, in Rachel Murphy & Vanessa Fong (eds), Chinese Experiences 
of Citizenship, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2004. Even today it appears – from 
informal field observations – that a large share of Muslims currently migrating to Tibet originates from Linxia.  
10 Chu Wen-Chang, The Moslem Rebellion in North-West China, 1861-1878, Den Haag: Mouton, 1966. 
11 See Goodman (2004), p.6; Ma Bufang “established essentially a separate, and Islamic, state-with-a-state in 
Qinghai under the Republic,” relying heavily on the Hui and Salar while marginalizing Tibetans, Tu and 
Mongolians from the ranks of officers and officials. Goodman does not qualify his use of the term ‘ethnic 
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spatia l divisions between Tibetans and Muslims in the northeast corner of Qinghai were 
moulded through such historical dynamics. Although Amdo Tibetans clearly see the Muslims 
as outsiders in Amdo, most of the Hui and Salar within these areas – and about half of the 
Han – are indigenous to the larger Qinghai-Gansu region, and many families have been 
residing in Tibetan towns for over a century, if not several. Intermarriage, whether forced, 
voluntary or political, has also been common between Tibetans and the local Muslims and 
Han.12   
 
Recent decades 
The introduction of revolutionary political ideologies into the intricate ethnic framework of 
Kham and Amdo seems to have created much confusion within the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). For instance, it seems that the Communists mistakenly believed that the Amdo 
Tibetans would support them because they had defeated Ma Bufang in 1949, but they were 
themselves faced by violent resistance from both Tibetans and Muslims throughout the 1950s 
in response to forced collectivisation and attacks on the traditional social order of both ethnic 
groups, which reneged on earlier promises made by the CCP.13 Similar resistance also took 
place in Kham, whereas confrontations in Central Tibet were toned down due to the special 
political arrangements that were in place until 1959. Nonetheless, tensions were exacerbated 
in all three cases by the radicalisation of Maoism throughout the 1950s and into the 1970s. 
 
Since the beginning of the reform period in 1978, ideological Marxism has played less and 
less of a role in both cultural encounters and state policy making, and Tibetan-Han conflict 
has gradually clarified as an issue of state control over a strategic minority region. 
Confrontations are invariably portrayed by the exiles and in the west as a one-sided political 
conflict between occupied and occupiers. Such a portrayal is more or less accurate, in that the 
Han maintain hegemony over state power, and most of the recent overt conflict appears to 
involve the well-documented repression of a variety of Tibetan activities by the Chinese 
state.14 These include the politicised patriotic education campaigns in the monasteries and in 
various work units that started in earnest in the mid-1990s, the arrest and detention of pro-
independence demonstrators, the banning of photos and worship of the Dalai Lama in the 
TAR as well as in sensitive counties outside the TAR, and certain localized events of religious 
and political repression. Predictably, Kham continues to be a site of intense contestation up to 
                                                                                                                                                        
cleansing’, but he refers to a local Chinese historical study. Presumably it refers to a process of pushing Tibetans 
off the lower altitude lands and up into the peripheries of the counties.  
12 Goodman (2004), p.2 estimates that about half of the Han in Qinghai are actually indigenous to the province. 
He describes the local Han as having “a distinct local culture and language. They are predominantly Buddhist, 
and in rural areas have often adopted Hui and Tibetan lifestyles and customs” (Goodman, 2004, p.5). This would 
refer to the lifestyles in the lower lands. I have not observed any local Han involved in high altitude plateau 
pastoralism. 
13 For instance, see Melvyn Goldstein, ‘Introduction and The Revival of Monastic Life in Drepung Monastery’, 
in Melvyn Goldstein & Matthew Kapstein (eds), Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet: Religious Revival and Ethnic 
Identity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, pp. 1-45. Also Goodman (2004), p. 6.  
14 Indeed, in recent years, since the subsiding of the waves of demonstrations that centred on Lhasa and rippled 
throughout the Tibetan areas from 1987 to the mid-1990s, there have been few reports of Tibetans attacking Han, 
even though such acts could be well exploited by Beijing to justify their overwhelming security presence in the 
Tibetan areas, much as they have done in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Nonetheless, since the mid-
1990s, Chinese officials have reported at least eight bomb explosions in Lhasa, purportedly linked to the ‘Dalai 
clique’, and at least three bomb explosions in Sichuan that were claimed to involve Tibetans, one in Chengdu 
and two in the Ganzi TAP. See TIN, ‘Bomb blast in Chengdu’, London: Tibet Information Network, 24 April 
2002.  
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the present, with several recent high profile incidents carrying much symbolic importance to 
the exile community and to western Tibet Support Groups.15 
 
Meanwhile, the reform period in Amdo has also witnessed the re-emergence of an anti-
Muslim discourse among Tibetans, along with occasional outbreaks of violence. A higher 
order of tension is usually experienced in the towns that straddle the Muslim and Tibetan 
areas.16 Nonetheless, even further south, where the Muslim presence is minimal, boycott 
campaigns against Muslim businesses, in particular restaurants, are commonly cited events. 
Such boycotts often succeed in causing the targeted businesses to close down and move out.17  
 
Evidently, religion pervades many of the conflicts, in large part because Buddhism is deeply 
embedded in Tibetan culture and society. This in part reflects the historical development of 
political ideology in Tibet, which prescribed a dominant role to religious institutions in the 
traditional political economy. 18 Monasteries were also usually in command of considerable 
military strength in their local arenas of power, either directly or through alliances, and often 
acted as the centres for organised armed resistance throughout history. 19 Notably, revolts in 
Kham and Amdo during the first decade of Communist rule usually centred on some of the 
most prominent monasteries of the region. 20 
 
Combined with the attack on the traditional socio-religious order during the first three 
decades of Communist rule, it is natural that modern expressions of self-determination and 
dissent have found their way through religious channels, and the newfound religious space 
that slowly emerged in the reform period inevitably became politicised.21 In particular, 
religious repression has undoubtedly left a legacy of sharply defined animosity between the 
majority of Tibetans and the secular Chinese state. While this has primarily been defined 
along religious grounds, it has been associated with Han agency. 22 In this context, ethnic 
identities become reinforced by Buddhist identity, in contradistinction to non-Buddhist 
                                                 
15 These include the bomb incident in Chengdu in April 2002, and the subsequent arrest and death sentence of 
Tenzin Deleg Rimpoche; or the demolitions at the Serthar Institute in 2001 in the Ganzi TAP of Sichuan. See 
TIN, ‘Death sentences for “sabotaging China’s unity” and “Terrorism”’, London: Tibet Information Network, 27 
January 2003; and TIN, ‘Expulsion of nuns and students threaten survival of important Tibetan Buddhist 
institute’, London: Tibet Information Network, 19 August 2001 (2001b). The Serthar demolitions involved the 
expulsion of several thousand monks and nuns, including an estimated one thousand Han Chinese monks, and 
the destruction of about one thousand dwellings. Certain counties, such as Ganzi and Litang, also appear to be 
the focus of intensive re-education campaigns. 
16 In particular, Chentsa (Ch. Jianzha) County on the northern edge of Huangnan TAP, bordering the Hualong 
HAC and containing a significant resident Muslim population, has been the scene of several clashes in recent 
years, usually involving a fight, some deaths on the Tibetan side, and then rioting Tibetans. For instance, see 
CNN, ‘Tibetans, Muslim Huis clash in China’, CNN (23 February 2003). 
17 Based on accounts from interviews with several Tibetans from the southern area of Qinghai in summer 2003. 
18 For instance, see Georges Dreyfus, ‘Tibetan Religious Nationalism: Western fantasy or empowering vision?, 
in P. Christiaan Klieger (ed.) Voices of Difference, Leiden: Brill, 2002, pp. 37-56.  
19 For instance, see the analysis of the uprising at Batang in 1905 by Coleman (2002) or the account of the siege 
of Sangpiling monastery in 1906 by van Spengen (2002).  
20 Resistance to collectivisation in the 1950s in Kham and Amdo was typically organised around monasteries, 
exemplified by the uprisings at Litang and Batang, which resulted in the two monasteries being bombed and 
shelled by the PLA (Goldstein, 1998, p. 8). Also see Shakya (1999). 
21 For discussions of this, see Melvyn Goldstein, ‘Introduction and The Revival of Monastic Life in Drepung 
Monastery’, in Melvyn Goldstein & Matthew Kapstein (eds), Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet: Religious 
Revival and Ethnic Identity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, pp. 1-45; and Ronald D. Schwartz, 
Circle of Protest: political ritual in the Tibetan uprising , London: Hurst, 1994.  
22 Nonetheless, it should also be pointed out that intra-communal or intra-ethnic conflict often blurs with 
interethnic conflict in the Tibetan areas, particularly given that elite co-optation by the Chinese is a legacy that 
predates the communist era. For instance, see Goldstein (1989), Shakya (1999), and Peng (2002).   
 7
groups, which would include Muslims as well as the Han, defined as atheist Communists. In 
light of their practical objectives of controlling these areas, the paranoia of the Chinese 




Population on the Tibetan plateau reconsidered 
These issues of ethnic conflict provide the backdrop for debates on population swamping. The 
popular hypothesis is clear and appealing. Recent Han and Muslim migration into the Tibetan 
urban areas is portrayed as a case of generalized population transfer. Such transfers are 
compared to similar scenarios in Inner Mongolia, which left Mongolians a small minority in 
their autonomous region, or else in Xinjiang, where the Han account for almost half of the 
2000 census population, up from around six percent in the early 1950s. Indeed, many exile 
leaders have claimed that Tibetans may already be a minority in many Tibetan areas.23  
 
Within this general analysis, urban growth is portrayed as an instrument of population 
swamping and control. The Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy makes one of 
the more subtle versions of this argument, using the vocabulary of economic, social and 
cultural rights, such as the right to land and housing. They contend “the continuing flood of 
Chinese settlers into Tibet” underlies “the inequality and discrimination of both [rural] land 
and [urban] housing developments”. 24 Top-down instituted policies that purposely 
discriminate against locals and encourage Han in-settlers are argued to be a continuation of a 
decades-long effort to sinicize the region, destroying the social and cultural fabric of Tibet. 
They do not reject urbanity per se, but focus on the discriminatory nature of Chinese- induced 
urbanisation in the Tibetan areas, which ultimately has a transformative impact that is anti-
Tibetan.  
 
Without disputing the well- founded convictions held by their proponents, such claims are 
used to create a sense of urgency. This urgency is required by the exiles in order to 
continuously mobilize international opinion, as this is virtually the only hand of cards that 
they can play against the Chinese leadership. Nonetheless, given the gravity of such claims 
and their influence on perceptions of ethnic conflict, they deserve to be examined under a 
more critical light. 
 
The claim of population swamping is definitely true for key population centres such as Lhasa 
and other strategic cities and towns, although it appears to exaggerate the situation for the 
general population. This is simply a matter of arithmetic; the traditional Tibetan areas remain 
the most rural of China, and their rural dwellers are mostly Tibetan or, in some cases, several 
closely related indigenous ethnicities. Therefore, if the traditional Tibetan areas are properly 
                                                 
23 For example, see Mahalanobis (2003). 
24 TCHRD, Annual Report 2002: Human Rights Situation in Tibet, Dharamsala, Tibetan Centre for Human 
Rights and Democracy, 2003. Their reference to land draws on arguments made by the Habitat International 
Coalition that link the right to land to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Ironically though, rural land tenure systems in China, including the Tibetan areas, have maintained one of the 
most equitable distributions of land assets in the developing world. For instance, see the extensive work of 
Azizur Rahman Khan & Carl Riskin, Inequality and Poverty in China in the Age of Globalization, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001. Therefore, these TCHRD arguments become restricted to localised cases of 
unfair rural land expropriations related to urban expansion, or else to the biased enforcement of environmental 
protection policies. 
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delineated and a few exceptional or frontier cases taken out,25 in most cases the urban Han 
would not compensate for the rural dominance of Tibetans, even if estimates of the Han 
population were underestimated. Because birth rates among rural Tibetans have been among 
the highest in the country since the 1980s, the combined migration and demographic 
dynamics are far from simple and transparent.  
 
Migration 
No doubt in-migration is an urgent issue in terms of urban employment opportunities and 
exclusion, although important features differentiate the Tibetan areas from Xinjiang and Inner 
Mongolia. Population transfer to Inner Mongolia was initiated during the Republican period, 
such that Mongolians were already a minority in their province by the beginning of 
Communist rule. Furthermore, the concept of transfer per se (i.e. organized large-scale 
movements of population from one region to another), would only apply in a general sense up 
to the end of the Maoist period in 1978. The large transfers that turned the share of Han from 
around fifty percent to over sixty percent of the population in Qinghai and from six to over 
forty percent in Xinjiang, took place entirely during the heydays of radical Maoism in the 
1950s, 1960s and early 1970s.26 
 
Population movement since the reform period, particularly since the early 1990s, has been 
more or less voluntary, implying that policies are based on incentives rather than command to 
promote migration. In this regard, the trend since the 1980s has been for a net population 
outflow from the impoverished western areas of China towards the coastal areas, which has 
been a considerable human resource drain for these western regions. The Tibetan areas, being 
some of the most impoverished, are not strangers to this outflow, and only the high levels of 
incentives for both Tibetan and Han skilled workers and professionals has counteracted this 
trend.  
 
Nonetheless, net outflow was the rule in both the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and 
Qinghai for much of the 1980s.27 For instance, registered net migration to the TAR was 
negative in every year from 1981 to 1992 besides three. The greatest outflows took place in 
1981 and 1982 due to a change in cadre policy, allowing many Han cadres to return home and 
increasing the representation of local Tibetan cadres, but registered net outflows continued at 
                                                 
25 An example of a frontier case is Kangding (Tib. Dartsedo) County in the Ganzi TAP in Sichuan, which was 
visited during recent fieldwork. This county would have been mostly Tibetan prior to the 20th century, but it has 
served as a Chinese administrative centre for what is now the Ganzi TAP for more than a century, during which 
it was the focus of colonisation strategies. See Coleman (2002) and Van Spengen (2002). As a result, it is now 
about half Han if not more, notably with a strong rural Han presence. Nonetheless, the population becomes 
indisputably Tibetan after the first pass west of Kangding, with almost no Han in the rural areas.  
26 For the rates of net inflow to Qinghai during this period, see Qinghai Bureau of Statistics (QBS), Qinghai 
Statistical Yearbook 2003, Beijing: China Statistical Press, 2003, table 3-3. David Goodman points out that 
although there was a large inflow of Han to Qinghai from 1956-1959, there was a large exodus following the 
famine of the Great Leap Forward, and “while there was significant in-migration during the era of the Cultural 
Revolution, at the rate of 100-150,000 people a year, it was for the most part balanced by the numbers of those 
leaving over the same period” (Goodman, 2004, p. 7). Therefore, Chinese plans in the 1950s for a massive 
population transfer to Qinghai, with the goal to reach ten million people by 1967 (Goodman, 2004, p. 6), were 
singularly unsuccessful, given that the population of Qinghai had only reached 3.65 million by 1978 (QSB, table 
3-1). 
27 Note that the TAR and Qinghai will serve as the reference points for most of the aggregate macro analysis of 
this paper. They are the only two provincial-level jurisdictions where such analysis is appropriate, given that all 
of the TAR and almost all of Qinghai are composed of traditional Tibetan areas (see the discussion of Qinghai 
below). Sichuan does not provide an appropriate analysis at the provincial level because most of the population 
resides in the eastern non-Tibetan half of the province. Even the provincial figures for Qinghai distract from the 
fact that the bulk of the urban Han and Muslim populations do not necessarily reside in the Tibetan areas. 
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a steady pace in the late 1980s and early 1990s.28 A return to net inflows only restarted in the 
mid-1990s following the increased subsidies that accompanied the Third Tibet Work Forum 
in 1994. In Qinghai, registered net outflows started in 1980 and have remained consistently 
negative from 1986 until 2002, with peaks between 1988 and 1993.29 It can be safely assumed 
that the bulk of the outflow was Han in both cases, given that they are largely urban and non-
indigenous in the Tibetan areas, and with a cultural orientation directed towards the rest of 
China.30 Thus by nature they are more mobile than the rural Tibetan population. 
 
These statistics refer to officially registered moves (i.e. they are sourced from the Public 
Security Bureaus). In addition, as with all Chinese population statistics, they do not refer to 
the resident military population, which is considerable in both the TAR and Qinghai. 31 They 
therefore relate to changes in the non-military population with permanent or other forms of 
long-term residential status, whereas much of migration involves a variety of temporary 
statuses, especially in the Tibetan areas. Yet even this considered, the Tibetan areas do not 
stand out as obvious net inflow regions, in contrast to Xinjiang where this is definitely the 
case.  
 
This can be illustrated by comparing population surveys with the 2000 census. The annual 
surveys of population change are only conducted with permanently residing households and 
exclude both short and long-term migrants. This introduces a bias in the surveys depending on 
whether the province experiences a net inflow or outflow of population. Effective populations 
in the inflow provinces are underestimated given that migrants are not usually registered as 
permanent residents and do not show up in the surveys. Populations in the outflow provinces 
are overestimated, given that temporary migrants usually maintain their permanent status in 
their source province, which in turn exaggerates the baseline residency records used for the 
survey estimates. In contrast, the 2000 census went to great lengths to record temporary 
residents and represents the most accurate portrait of effective provincial populations since 
the beginning of the reform period. This difference in reporting therefore provides a 
convenient and indirect way to track net inflows or outflows.   
 
In several of the strategic and sparsely populated far western provinces, these two trends of 
inflow and outflow overlap and create a churning effect. On the one hand, temporary in-
migration from other provinces takes place within the context of western development 
projects or military activities, alongside ‘spontaneous’ migration that accompanies increased 
government subsidies. Many of such westward in-migrants come for a short period and do not 
expect to set up as permanent residents. Thus, they do not necessarily change their registration 
status to the host province, even if residency rules are considerably more lax than in the 
coastal areas (military personnel do not appear in the provincial statistics in any case). On the 
other hand, this inward flow overlaps with the out-migration of previous temporary in-
migrants and, to a lesser extent, of locals. Although out-migration receives less attention, it is 
                                                 
28 See Robin Iredale, Naran Bilik & Wang Su, Contemporary Minority Migration, Education, and Ethnicity in 
China, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001, p.151. 
29 QBS (2003), table 3-3. 
30 For instance, although minority populations in China had become more mobile in the 1990s, mobility was still 
significantly lower and started later than the Han Chinese. See Iredale et al. (2001). 
31 Estimates for the military in the TAR in the 1990s ranged from anywhere between 40,000 to 200,000 or more, 
the upper end during military exercises and other shows of force (UNPO, ‘China’s Tibet’: The World’s Largest 
Remaining Colony. Report of a Fact-Finding Mission and Analyses of Colonialism and Chinese Rule in Tibet, 
The Hague: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, 1997, p. 70). If a very rough guesstimate of 
130,000 were taken, this would be equivalent to about one soldier for every 20 residents. Nationally, the 
equivalent measure would be one soldier for every 4,500 residents. 
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a considerable source of concern for local authorities. Because the host populations are small, 
the inflows potentially outweigh the outflows, particularly during a period of high 
government spending. In this case the surveys may underestimate the effective population.  
 
Table 1: Selected population statistics (unit = 10,000 persons) 











 (B-C)/B 1999 survey 
Inflow provinces 
Guangdong 7270 8642 8523 7783 18.9% 1.4% 9.92 
Shanghai 1474 1674 1641 1614 13.6% 2.0% -1.10 
Xinjiang 1774 1925 1846 1876 8.5% 4.1% 11.80 
Fujian 3316 3471 3410 3440 4.7% 1.8% 5.21 
Stable provinces 
Ningxia 543 562 548.6 563 3.5% 2.4% 12.32 
TAR 256 262 261.6 263 2.3% 0.2% 15.80 
Yunnan 4192 4288 4236 4287 2.3% 1.2% 11.66 
Qinghai 510 518 482.3 523 1.6% 6.9% 13.90 
Inner Mong. 2362 2376 2332 2377 0.5% 1.9% 7.24 
Gansu 2543 2562 2512 2575 0.7% 2.0% 9.17 
Outflow provinces 
Shaanxi 3618 3605 3537 3659 -0.3% 1.9% 6.13 
Sichuan  8550 8329 8235 8640 -2.6% 1.1% 6.78 
Guizhou 3710 3525 3525 3799 -5.0% 0.0% 14.24 
National 125909 126583 124261 127627 0.5% 1.8% 8.77 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook 2000 , Beijing: China Statistical Press, 2000, 
table 4-3 (hereafter, referred to as CSY); CSY 2001: table 4-3; CSY 2002: tables 4-3 and 4-8. 
 
According to this comparison, Guangdong in the southeast stands out as the quintessential 
inflow province, whereas Guizhou is the most extreme case of an outflow province, both of 
which are intuitive results. Xinjiang also stands out as a definite inflow province, indicating 
that inflows have greatly exceeded outflows in recent years. On the other hand, both the TAR 
and Qinghai appear relatively stable. In both cases, the difference between the census and 
survey is less than one percent above the rate of natural population increase in 1999, much of 
which could be accounted for by measurement errors.33 Despite the evident visibility of in-
migration to the Tibetan areas, these observations point to the fact that such migration 
involves considerable churning rather than sustained inflows as in the case of Xinjiang.  
 
The common rebuttal to this observation is that Han migrants are underestimated in the 
Tibetan areas due to the sensitivity of their presence, particularly in the TAR, or else due to 
their ‘floating’ character. For instance, the 2000 census only records about 160,000 Han in the 
                                                 
32 The first compares the difference between the 1999 population survey estimate and the 2000 adjusted census 
population, apparently estimated after the post-census survey. The second is the equivalent of the estimated 
census error, i.e. the difference between the population estimate adjusted by the post-census survey and the 
detailed tabulation of the original survey. 
33 In particular, Qinghai recorded the largest discrepancy in the country between the original census tabulation 
and the adjusted post-census survey estimation, represented by the second last column. It is not clear whether the 
census adjustment resulted from political expediency or technical evaluations, but Qinghai would definitely 
appear as a net outflow province if a lower population measure, more in line with the tabulation, were to be 
considered. 
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TAR, a number that is treated with incredulity by most observers. Apparently, TAR officials 
estimate the population of Lhasa city alone at over half Han, or more than 100,000 people 
according to the 2000 census.34 Yet despite a similar sensitivity, an underestimation of the 
Han population in Xinjiang is not apparent in the census data, which unequivocally show a 
massive inflow from outside the province. Also, the TAR aside, an inflow of Han into western 
provinces such as Qinghai is not necessarily treated as a subject to be avoided by local 
officials. On the contrary, it is often interpreted as an indication of success in attempts to 
attract skilled labour and to stem outflow, thus supporting the developmental goal of building 
human resources.  
 
In the case of the TAR, the Han census count was obviously an undershot. Arguments of 
statistical manipulation aside, there may be several reasons why the Han count was low. 
Temporary migration is not one of them per se.35 However, timing is critical. The census was 
taken in November when most of the seasonal Han migrants would have already left for the 
winter. The figure of 160,000 may therefore represent a reasonable count of the number of 
non-military Han who were actually residing in the TAR all year round in 2000. Also, 
military personnel would represent a significant proportion of the visual presence of Han in 
Lhasa and in other cities and towns. Conversely, informal estimates made by tourists, 
journalists, NGO workers and researchers are mostly taken during the summer months, when 
the Han presence is swollen by tourism. Most Chinese tourists, numbered at close to 900,000 
in 2003, visit the TAR between May and September. 
 
In other words, although there has been a definite increase in Han migration to the TAR since 
the mid-1990s, particularly during the summer months, such migration is not stable. It is to be 
differentiated from the case of Xinjiang in that Han migrants by and large do not settle in the 
long term, as opposed to Tibetan migrants who tend to view their moves to the city as 
permanent.36 The Han component of the churning migration would therefore be very 
susceptible to changes in economic conditions, and net flows probably depend on the degree 
                                                 
34 Pioneer, ‘Tibetans to become minority in Lhasa: China’, The Pioneer, 9 August 2002. 
35 There is much confusion in this regard, as many believe that the census did not record temporary migrants.  
For example, see TIN, ‘Dramatic transformation of Lhasa planned; new railway station announced’, London: 
Tibet Information Network , 13 June 2001 (2001a), at http://www.tibetinfo.net/news-updates/nu130601.htm, 
where they state that the census does not include the “floating population”. They therefore imply that when 
officials report that 30 percent of the Lhasa population are temporary residents, population estimates are 
correspondingly underestimated.  In fact, the 2000 census did attempt to record all types of migrants, down to 
those who had not yet resolved their residency status. The only migrants who would not have been counted were 
either those that had hid from the census takers – which is more of an issue in the coastal areas given official 
belligerence towards migrants, but less in the west where migrants are encouraged – or else the common 
omissions, due to the difficulties of tracking migrants versus permanent residents. Another confusion arises from 
the de jure approach to residency status stipulated by the census, which many interpret as referring to permanent 
or settled residency. The de jure approach actually refers to the fact that residency is recorded by officially 
registered status regardless of the amount of time spent in a location, in contrast to standard international 
definitions which consider de facto residency, i.e. usually requiring six months for a person who is making a 
domestic move to be considered a permanent resident in their destination. The Chinese approach is equivalent to 
a concept of citizenship, such that a person can reside in a place for years without being considered permanent in 
the census so long as they have not made an officia l change in status.  
36 Iredale, Bilik & Wang (2001), pp.157-158. In their two surveys of minority and Han migrants in Lhasa in 
1996 and 1997, they found that most Han migrants envisage staying about five to six years, after which they 
return home with their savings, whereas most minority migrants coming from other parts of Tibet want to stay 
permanently. Note that they do not refer to the phenomenon of seasonal migration among the Han, yet in my 
own informal observations, many Han leave for the winter on top of having a temporary timeline for their 
activities in the TAR. 
 12
of subsidies entering these areas. Rapidly increasing subsidies, as has been the case since the 
late 1990s, would obviously encourage a trend of inflow.  
 
However, the question remains whether such inflows could be sustained in the long term once 
subsidies stabilize (or even fall) after the completion of one or two mega projects, such as the 
Qinghai-Tibet railway. The underlying trend would suggest that inflows face an uphill battle 
against outflows. Net in-migration into such areas would respond to subsidies and economic 
incentives – such as employment and business opportunities – not to the existence of transport 
infrastructure per se. 
 
For instance, even though the completion of the railway might increase migration to places 
such as Germo in Qinghai or Lhasa in the TAR, it will do so primarily because of the state-
subsidised boom in these cities and not because of the easing of transport per se. On the other 
hand, the railway will also ruin many of the catering businesses that are currently stretched 
out along the highway that runs parallel to the railway construction. These businesses are 
mainly run by Hui Muslims and Han Sichuanese, and cater to both highway traffic and 
construction workers. Locals in the Tibetan areas of Sichuan that service the current Chengdu 
to Lhasa highway make similar predictions. An economic downturn caused by such structural 
transformations in the regional economy could exacerbate the out-migration of both Tibetans 
and Han from certain counties, even while increasing migration to others.  
 
In this regard, locals in the Tibetan areas of Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu and Yunnan often 
complain that they are considerably underprivileged in comparison to the TAR, even while 
containing more than half of the national Tibetan population. They note that while the TAR 
‘belongs’ to Beijing, which is rich, they ‘belong’ to their respective western provinces, which 
are poor. In addition, the TAR carries an added political sensitivity, with the result that this 
provincial- level jurisdiction receives an enormous amount of per capita central funding. In 
contrast, local governments in the Tibetan areas outside the TAR are often left with few 
means to stem an outflow of labour in the event of a collapse in a key industry. For instance, 
the 1998 moratorium on forestry activities declared by the national government in response to 
flooding on the Yangtze had a debilitating impact on many Tibetan counties in Sichuan and 
Yunnan, which probably resulted in increased out-migration from these counties. It cannot, 
therefore, be assumed that the migration scenario of the TAR represents the norm in the 
Tibetan areas outside the TAR, given that the former is a response to massive levels of 
subsidisation.  
 
Migration versus demographics 
While earlier population transfers to Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia had a strong agrarian focus, 
contemporary migration to the Tibetan areas has been almost entirely urban in destination. 
Even in Qinghai, much of the in-migration in the 1950s and 1960s was agricultural, although 
concentrated in the non-Tibetan areas of the province. As a result, rural populations in those 
provinces that experienced an earlier epoch of population transfer are of mixed ethnicity, and 
Han urban dominance is partially matched by their presence in the rural areas.  
 
On the other hand, Han agrarian colonisation of the high-altitude Tibetan plateau rarely met 
with success and more often with disaster.37 Therefore, the rural areas of the high-altitude 
plateau remain almost entirely ethnically Tibetan, along with pockets of several other closely 
                                                 
37 For a description of the failures of agrarian colonisation in Qinghai during the 1950s and 1960s, see Goodman 
(2004), p. 6-7. It appears that mortality rates in Qinghai were among the highest in the country during the famine 
of the Great Leap Forward, although this was not the case in the TAR. 
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related ethnicities such as the Tu, Mongolians, Qiang, Lhoba, Moinba, and so forth. Han rural 
presence is mostly government related, or it is restricted to certain mineral resource enclaves, 
suburban vegetable farming, or highway catering, all of which are often based around towns 
in any case; as well as seasonal business migration related to tourism, mushroom digging, and 
so forth. For instance, 97.6 percent of the TAR rural population in the 2000 census was 
Tibetan. Even if the Han population of the province were underestimated, this particular rural 
measure would not be affected given that the underestimation almost entirely takes place in 
the urban areas. Even in eastern Tibetan areas that are relatively close to large cities such as 
Xining, Lanzhou or Chengdu, rural populations in the decisively Tibetan areas remain 
predominantly Tibetan. 38 
 
Because fertility is considerably higher in the rural areas, this logically places the weight of 
population momentum with rural dwellers. In Tibetan areas, this implies Tibetans, a fact that 
is amplified by their low rates of urbanisation. In particular, the one-child policy, which 
became a two-child policy for rural dwellers, was more leniently applied in many minority 
areas,39 with the result that rural Tibetans today have among the highest rates of natural 
population increase in the country. This is poignantly summarised by the findings of 
Goldstein et al. in their presentation of survey results in fourteen farming villages in the TAR: 
 
…the 141 currently married women aged 50–54 and 55–59… had, on the average, 
6.9 and 7.1 live births, respectively. …currently married women aged 35–39 
had… 4.1 live births, and those 40–44 had 5.7… The proportion of births that 
were third, fourth, or a higher birth order also indicates high fertility and is 
evidence for the absence of any program of systematic forced birth limits in 
Tibet’s rural areas. Of the 131 births that occurred in 1997 to the women in our 
study, 45.4% were third or higher birth order, 31.5% were fourth birth order or 
higher, and 20.8% were fifth or higher. Similarly, 70.1% of the 1,110 women who 
have ever given birth… had three or more live births, 55.9% had four or more, 
and 41.4% had five or more.40  
 
These survey results refer to the TAR, where the application of family planning has been 
treated with extra sensitivity. In the Tibetan regions outside the TAR, family planning policies 
might have been applied more stringently than in the TAR, although the rate of natural 
population increase in Qinghai has been consistently very close to that of the TAR up to the 
present, both being the highest in the country. Thus it is likely that family planning has also 
been lenient in the minority areas of Qinghai as well.  
 
In other words, net in-migration to the Tibetan areas competes with these demographic 
factors, such that sustained net inflows of Han would be required merely to maintain their 
                                                 
38 This is confirmed by numerous informal observations and conversations with Chinese scholars. For instance, 
one scholar told me that in Derge County in Sichuan, just across the border from the TAR, the county population 
is 96 percent Tibetan. The main town is a little more than half non-Tibetan, most of which is Han, although the 
town accounts for less than ten percent of the county’s population. These ethnic shares of the town would 
nonetheless dominate the observation of the casual visitor. Similarly, in Tawu (Ch. Daofu) County of Sichuan, 
within a one-day drive from Chengdu, locals unanimously agree that very few, if any, Chinese are engaged in 
agriculture in the county.  
39 For instance, see Melvyn C. Goldstein, Ben Jiao, Cynthia M. Beall & Phuntsog Tsering, ‘Fertility and Family 
Planning in Rural Tibet’, The China Journal, 47 (January 2002), pp.25-39. 
40 Melvyn C. Goldstein, Ben Jiao, Cynthia M. Beall & Phuntsog Tsering, ‘Development and Change in Rural 
Tibet: Problems and Adaptations’, Asian Survey 43: 5 (September/October 2003), pp.771-772. 
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ethnic share in the population, let alone increase it. In addition, the Han migrants are 
disproportionately male, of working age, and they do not tend to bring their families with 
them during their temporary sojourns.41 These attributes amplify their employment impact, as 
well as their demand for alcohol and prostitutes, but lower considerably the rates of natural 
population increase among Han in the Tibetan areas. Therefore, while inflows of migration 
might dominate over the demographic momentum during economic boom time, the balance 
could quickly be reversed when boom turns to bust, reinforcing the previous analysis of 
inflows versus outflows. 
  
Thus despite the visibility of in-migration, Tibetan population shares may in certain cases be 
increasing rather than decreasing, mainly outside the TAR. This would appear to be the case 
in Qinghai, where the share of Tibetans in the population has been slowly edging upwards 
during the reform period, from 18.5 percent in 1978 to 21.9 percent in 2002, and growing at 
about the same rate overall as the Hui Muslims.42 It is not the case in the TAR from the 1990s 
onwards, partly because the Han have been increasing from a very small base, and partly 
because the high levels of subsidy overwhelm the local economy, creating distorted incentives 
for in-migrants. The general pattern of such changes can be seen in Table 2 below, although 
Tibetans are not differentiated from other minorities.43 
 
Table 2: Changes in the population of Han and minority nationalities (1990 and 2000 censuses) 
in the five provinces with TAPs and for China as a whole  
 TAR Qinghai Sichuan Gansu Yunnan China Tibetans 
Annual change in population (%; non-cumulative) 
Total population (%) 1.7% 1.5% 0.6% 1.3% 1.4% 1.1% -- 
Minority population (%) 1.5% 2.2% 1.9% 1.8% 1.5% 1.5% 1.8% 
Han population (%) 6.5% 0.9% 0.5% 1.3% 1.4% 1.0% -- 
Share of minorities in total population (%) 
1990 census  95.9% 42.2% 4.4% 8.3% 33.4% 8.0% 0.41% 
2000 census  93.9% 45.6% 5.0% 8.7% 33.4% 8.4% 0.43% 
Percentile change -2.0% +3.4% +0.6% +0.4% 0.0% +0.4% 0.02% 
Sources: Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics, 
China Population Statistical Yearbook 2001 , Beijing: China Statistical Press, 2001, tables 2-13, 2-14 and 2-21 
(hereafter referred to as CPSY).  
 
                                                 
41 For instance, see the survey results of the TAR in Iredale, Bilik & Wang (2001), p.156. 
42 QBS (2003), table 3-5. Note that a major drop in the Tibetan share took place before the reform period, from 
27.5 percent of the 1952 population to 18.5 percent in 1978. In contrast, the Hui Muslim share only fell from 15 
to 13.1 percent, and the other smaller ethnic groups experienced almost no fall in share. In other words, the 
Tibetan population grew 48 percent over the 26-year period, whereas the Hui grew by 93 percent. This slow 
Tibetan growth may indicate some of the widespread repression, incarcerations and executions of Tibetans that 
were known to have taken place in the late 1950s and early 1960s, along with refugee movements to India. This 
appears to be confirmed by population records from this period, which show the Tibetan population of Qinghai 
dropping from 513,000 in 1957 to 478,000 in 1959 and 408,000 in 1963, although growing before and after these 
years (QSY, 1991, p. 163). Nonetheless, Goodman (2004, p. 6) points out that Muslims also underwent similar 
repression in the late 1950s, and also they experienced a smaller but significant drop in population between 1959 
and 1963. The slow Tibetan growth might therefore also represent errors in the earlier estimates, as there would 
have been little knowledge of the exact number of Tibetans in the dispersed southern regions of the province, 
whereas the other ethnicities tend to be much more concentrated closer to the administrative core of the 
province. Other factors may also play a role, such as changes in registered ethnic status.  
43 In the TAR, the category of ‘minorities’ would be almost entirely Tibetan. In Qinghai it is about two thirds 
composed of Tibetans, Tu and Mongolians, with the Hui and several other Muslim ethnicities such as the Salar 
accounting for most of the remainder. Tibetans are about a third of minorities in Sichuan, a fifth in Gansu and a 
small fraction in Yunnan as well as in China.  
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Interestingly, the annualised population change of Tibetans in the TAR, as measured by the 
two censuses, is quite low in comparison to the minorities of other provinces, particularly 
Qinghai. The high rate of natural population increase in the TAR contrasts with this result. 
This may be due to the out-migration of Tibetans, including regular and refugee travel to 
Nepal and India over the winter months.44 Measurement errors may have also played some 
role, particularly in the 1990 census.45 
 
Outside the TAR, minorities have either increased or maintained their shares throughout the 
decade, although this includes a mix of minorities. This would not be surprising because, as 
discussed above, these regions are less privileged than the TAR in terms of subsidisation. 
Thus outflows and demographics tend to dominate over inflows, particularly among the 
higher skilled and more mobile urbanites, who tend to be Han rather than Tibetan or Muslim.  
 
Hence, the changing face of Han dominance in eastern Tibet represents qualitative changes 
rather than quantitative proportional changes. For instance, Han arriving since the mid-1990s 
are much more commercially oriented than previous waves of Han migrants, whose make up 
was more political, ideological and administrative, and whose movement was tightly guided 
by the state. In an increasingly market-driven environment where self-promotion becomes the 
norm, the commercial orientation of current Han migrants in the Tibetan areas exaggerates 
their seemingly dominant population presence, particularly in the towns and cities where most 
commercial activity is concentrated.  
 
Differential rates of urbanisation versus population shares 
Rather than changing ethnic shares, the main population schisms between the Han, Muslims 
and Tibetans within these provinces are sharp differences in their urbanisation rates. Current 
interprovincial migration accentuates these differences given that the destination of most Han 
and Muslim migrants to the Tibetan areas is urban. Although the Han population share may 
be small in these Tibetan areas, this share is concentrated in the urban areas, precisely where 
it is most visible. As mentioned above, this visual presence is further reinforced by the 
economic dominance of the Han, which exaggerates their actual numerical presence.  
 
For instance, in the 2000 census Tibetans were overwhelmingly rural in all of the five Chinese 
provinces that incorporate Tibetan areas, with 87.2 percent living in rural areas overall. 
Urbanisation rates among Tibetans ranged from a low of 8.6 percent in Qinghai to a high of 
15.2 percent in the TAR. At the other extreme, urbanisation rates among the recorded Han 
were 79.5 percent in the TAR and 44.7 percent in Qinghai, both rates higher than the national 
average of 36.9 percent. The Hui Muslims were 79.7 percent urban in the TAR, where their 
presence is small, and 29.7 percent urban in Qinghai, where they account for about a sixth of 
                                                 
44 Various sources have estimated that there were net outflows of Tibetans from Tibet into Nepal and India 
throughout the 1990s at around 3000 people per year. These would be from across the Tibetan areas, although a 
large share would have come from the TAR. Also, it is quite common for central Tibetans to travel to Nepal or 
India during the winter months for pilgrimage or trading. Therefore, just as the November date of the 2000 
census would have underestimated the Han population of the TAR, it might have also underestimated the 
Tibetan population. Conversely, the 1990 census was conducted in the summer.  
45 The results from the 1990 census appear to have created some confusion in the TAR with regard to population 
estimates. For instance, up to the 2000 Tibet Statistical Yearbook , two alternative population time series were 
provided for the 1990s. These included unrealistic downward adjustments in the demographic statistics to 
account for the lower of the two series. The 2000 census results confirmed the higher of the two series. Tibet 
Bureau of Statistics (TBS), Tibet Statistical Yearbook 2000 , Beijing: China Statistical Press, 2000, pp. 29-30.  
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the population. The Hui in Qinghai were less urbanised than the Han but much more than the 
Qinghai Tibetans.46 The extremely high rates in the TAR among the Han and Hui reflect the 
fact that they do not have an indigenous (i.e. rural) base in the province, although Muslim 
presence in urban Tibet dates back several centuries if not more, as discussed above. 
  
Furthermore, the Han and Muslim presence is more concentrated in cities than in towns, 
whereas urban Tibetans are more concentrated in towns than in cities, particularly outside the 
TAR. This reflects the fact that most urban jurisdictions in the Tibetan areas would be 
classified as towns by the census, with Lhasa being the notable exception. It also indicates 
that rural Tibetans first tend to migrate to local towns rather than to more distant and 
expensive cities, except in the case of migration related to education, particularly at the 
tertiary level. These findings are presented in Table 3 below, focusing on the TAR and 
Qinghai.47 
 
Table 3: Proportions of each ethnic group residing in rural, town or city, and their shares of 
total rural, town or city populations, the TAR and Qinghai (2000 census) 
Percent of group located in; Share of total population in;  
Rural Town City Rural Town City 
TAR 
Total population 80.6 % 11.1 % 8.3 % -- -- -- 
Tibetans  84.8 % 9.4 % 5.8 % 97.6 % 78.3 % 65.0 % 
Han 20.5 % 35.5 % 44.0 % 1.5 % 19.4 % 32.1 % 
Hui Muslims  20.3 % 25.6 % 54.0 % 0.1 % 0.8 % 2.2 % 
Qinghai 
Total population 67.7 % 11.7 % 20.7 % -- -- -- 
Tibetans (+Tu & Mong.)48 91.4 % 6.7 % 1.9 % 37.6 % 17.4 % 3.5 % 
Han 55.3 % 13.6 % 31.1 % 44.2 % 62.9 % 81.3 % 
Muslims (Hui & Salar) 70.3 % 12.8 % 17.0 % 18.1 % 19.1 % 14.3 % 
Tibetans in China 87.2 % 8.7 % 4.1 % -- -- -- 
Source: Tabulation (2002, tables 1-6, 1-6a, 1-6b and 1-6c). 
 
The urbanisation rates in 2000 suggest that the changes in the composition of the population 
in the Tibetan areas have been urban. It is clear that Tibetans have remained predominantly 
rural, while the Han, and to a lesser extent the Muslims in the case of Qinghai, have filled 
most of the rapid urban growth. Outside the TAR, such urban growth involves migration from 
                                                 
46 All data from Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of 
Statistics, Tabulation on the 2000 Population Census of the People's Republic of China , Beijing: China 
Statistical Press, 2002 (hereafter referred to as Tabulation). Note that there are some logistical problems with the 
definition of urban in China. For instance, see Zhou Yixing & Laurence Ma, ‘China’s Urbanization Levels: 
Reconstructing a Baseline from the Fifth Population Census’, The China Quarterly, 173 (March 2003), pp.176-
196. After much reading and discussion with several scholars, including one leading Chinese demographer, it 
seems that the definition used by the 2000 census provides a fairly accurate portrait of the overall urban 
population in China, although discrepancies might exist at the local level. Nonetheless, comparisons and trends 
are difficult to assess because the 2000 definitions of what constitutes an urban area are quite different from the 
1990 definitions. They can be estimated or adjusted on the national level, but at the local level, this would 
require a case-by-case study of each urban area. 
47 For comparison, the Yi in Sichuan, who share a prefecture with Tibetans in the south of the province, are even 
less urbanised that the Sichuan Tibetans, while the Qiang, who share a prefecture with Tibetans in northwest 
Sichuan, have the same rate as Tibetans. 
48 This row treats only the Tibetan population for the measure of urbanisation rates, but includes the Tu and 
Mongolians in the measure of their shares of total rural, town and city population.  
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outside the region, as well as the urbanisation of local Han and Muslims from within the 
region, particularly in the case of the Muslims in Qinghai and Gansu. 49  
 
Moreover, minority dominance in the rural areas is notable. The combined total of minority 
nationalities in Qinghai – predominantly Tibetan and Hui – gives them a majority in the rural 
areas, even before isolating the minority areas from the Han areas. Given the higher birth rates 
and lower urbanisation rates among both Tibetans and Muslims, this trend is likely to 
continue. In the TAR, the difference between the rurality of Tibetans and the urbanity of the 
Han and Hui is extreme. Therefore, the key issue is not whether the population balance has 
shifted towards the Tibetans or the Han, but that the latter have dominated urbanisation. 
Conversely, the urgent developmental issue for the minorities concerns access to the benefits 
of urban development. Because the towns and cities hold the levers of economic and political 
power, the relevant concern is economic and political dominance, not population dominance.   
 
The case of Qinghai 
Although the TAR receives most of the attention, the issues of population and migration are 
potentially more conflictive in Amdo or Kham, which are much closer to indigenous Han or 
Muslim population centres in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan or Yunnan. Qinghai probably 
represents the most complex case along this interface.  
 
Although most of the land area of Qinghai is designated as Tibetan autonomous areas in one 
form or another, the majority of the provincial population is Han, although the two do not 
necessarily overlap. The province is divided into eight prefectures, of which five are Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefectures (TAP) and one is a combined Tibetan-Mongolian Autonomous 
Prefecture (TMAP). These six account for 97.2 percent of the provincial land area.50 Even 
within the remaining two prefecture- level jurisdictions in the  northeast corner of the province, 
one of the four counties of Xining is a combined Hui-Tu Autonomous County, while four of 
the six counties of Haidong are similarly designated, one Hui, one combined Hui-Tu, one 
Salar and one Tu. All of these autonomous areas of various nationalities together account for 
98.9 percent of the provincial land area.51 Thus as expressed by Goodman, “the inherent 
contestation of Qinghai was and remains a significant factor… [leading] to the description of 
Qinghai as ‘a non self governing area of self government’.”52 
 
Such contestation is nonetheless concentrated in pockets. Around two thirds of the provincial 
population lives in the 2.8 percent of the land area comprised by Xining and Haidong. 53 This 
region is best conceived as an extension of Gansu province, and indeed, it was part of Gansu 
up until the creation of Qinghai in 1928.54 Today the region is effectively a Han and Muslim 
ethnic area despite several important Tibetan sites. About a fifth of Qinghai Tibetans also 
                                                 
49 From discussions with a colleague, it seems that many Muslims in Qinghai were forced out of the urban areas 
and into the rural areas during the population transfers of the Maoist period. These Hui would have tended to 
return to the urban areas as soon as population movements were liberalised from the 1980s onwards. 
50 Goodman (2004), p. 3. 
51 Marshall & Cooke (1997), p.2560.  
52 Goodman (2004), p.3. 
53 Goodman (2004), p. 3 puts this figure at 67.2 percent of the population. The detailed tabulation of Qinghai 
from the 2000 census was not yet available at the time of writing. 
54 Xining itself was established as a frontier town of the Chinese empire at least as early as the 12th century 
(Goodman, 2004, p.4). Similarly, the Gannan TAP of Gansu is best conceived as an extension of the Huangnan 
TAP in Qinghai, or in other words, as part of the cultural heart of Amdo. 
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reside in this area and account for close to a quarter of the population in two Muslim counties 
of Haidong. 55 
 
The other areas of contemporary Han expansion are in the northern Haibei TAP and the 
western Haixi TMAP. Both prefectures are very arid and largely composed of desert as well 
as a handsome supply of minerals and hydrocarbons, albeit difficult and expensive to access. 
Haixi in particular includes the mineral rich Qaidam Basin, and is well know as the location 
of the controversial World Bank-supported project that was cancelled by the Chinese 
government in 2000. Mineral resource development in these areas has resulted in the rapid 
expansion of several mining towns since the 1950s, populated mostly by Han, which dwarf 
the indigenous and extremely sparsely distributed Tibetan and Mongolian nomadic 
populations.   
 
Leaving aside the historically contested northeast corner of the province and the 
contemporary mining towns, the rest of the province is essentially Tibetan, with pockets of 
closely related Mongolian and Tu minorities, both of which are Tibetan speaking, Tibetan 
Buddhist and rural-based. Even considering Haixi TAP and its booming mining towns, such 
as Germo, the combination of Tibetans, Mongolians and Tu clearly forms a majority of the 
third of the population stretched out across the remaining 97.2 percent of the province. 
Excluding Germo and a few other mining towns, Tibetan-speakers are an even larger 
majority, overwhelmingly so in the rural areas, similar to the TAR. Debates on population 
shares rarely distinguish this point, given that the northeast corner is usually claimed by the 
Tibetan exiles, and Germo is held out as a prime example of population swamping. 
Nonetheless, the former is at best contested and the latter can be considered an exceptional 
case with little applicability outside the highly mineralised north and west. Within the more 
populated Tibetan areas closer to the northeast corner there is a definite inflow of Han and 
Hui traders and caterers from both within and without the province, although this inflow is 
essentially urban and counterbalanced by the higher rates of natural increase among the 
indigenous rural population, as discussed previously.  
 
Hence contemporary contestation in these areas takes place in the towns. The presence of 
Muslims is especially worth noting in this regard. The expansion of Muslim business 
networks into Tibetan towns leads to heightened competition precisely where the chances for 
Tibetans to integrate into the urban economy should be highest. This would explain rising 
tensions between Tibetans and Muslims in Qinghai, and the identification of Muslims as a 
particularly sharp thorn in the issue of migration to Tibetan areas. Notably, Muslims account 
for about thirty percent of the population of Jianzha (Tib. Chentsa) TAC, mostly concentrated 
in and around the main town, which in turn has been the site of some of the most violent 
Tibetan-Muslim confrontations in recent years, as noted in the first section. 56   
 
                                                 
55 These are the Hualong Hui Autonomous County (HAC) and the Xunhua Salar Autonomous County (SAC), 
both of which are located along the Yellow River and border the Huangnan TAP to the south. Tibetans typically 
reside in the higher altitude peripheries of these Haidong counties while the Hui (and Han) dominate the valleys. 
Prior to the 20th century Tibetans would have been more present in this region, although their peripheralization 
had as much to do with the previously discussed conflicts between Muslims and Tibetans as with Chinese 
population transfers in the 1950s and 1960s. 
56 This share appears to have been rising since the 1990 census, although comparison between various population 
sources is difficult given that population definitions are different. This considerable presence of resident 
Muslims does not extend further south to the other counties of the Huangnan TAP. In Tongren County, with the 
next largest presence of Muslims, they account for little more than five percent of the registered population (Yi, 
2004, p. 4).  
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In summary, the contemporary meeting points between ethnic ities are in the towns and cities, 
as they were in the past, although with important differences nonetheless. Modern 
demographic and economic transitions place greater pressures on such urban areas than would 
have historically been the case. For instance, rising population density and rapid urban 
expansion can give the visual impression that the more urbanised groups – Muslims or Han – 
are becoming more dominant even while they are only maintaining or even losing their share 




The Economic Foundations of Exclusionary Growth 57 
Interacting with these population dynamics, recent rapid economic growth in the Tibetan 
areas has been polarized, focusing excessively on urban administrative expansion and a 
handful of large-scale construction projects to an extent not seen elsewhere in China. In 
addition, the resuscitation of growth rates since the mid-1990s has taken place mainly through 
a phenomenal increase in subsidisation. 58 As a result, urban-rural inequalities in the Tibetan 
areas are considerably higher than everywhere else in China, including the other western 
provinces.59 This has put pressure on the few rapidly developing urban areas to fulfil 
expectations of local rural migrants and the urban poor, even while such rapid development 
remains rather exclusive, i.e. concentrated in high-wage and high-skill labour, without any 
significant supporting secondary productive activities to absorb lower skilled labour.  
  
The considerable leakage and low circulation effects of investment and wages in the local 
economy exacerbate these exclusionary aspects, given that most of the large construction 
projects are contracted to out-of-province companies. Such companies use a high input of 
outside finance, material resources and labour, both skilled and unskilled. In this sense, much 
of the external funding of the Tibetan areas can be seen as a strategy to nurture and promote 
regional or national construction companies, subsidising the development of their expertise in 
complex engineering projects, rather than using such funding to nurture the development of 
locally owned businesses and local expertise.60 Unfortunately, the out-of-province companies 
                                                 
57 This section is a summary of a forthcoming book by the author, Andrew Martin Fischer, State Growth and 
Social Exclusion in Tibet: The challenges of recent economic growth, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2004.   
58 By 2001, subsidies were equivalent to 71 percent of GDP in the TAR and 27 percent in Qinghai, having 
increased by 136 and 160 percent respectively since 1998 (Sources: 2002 CSY, tables 4-3, 8-1, 8-19 and 8-20, 
and equivalent tables in the 1999, 2000, and 2001 CSYs). A large share of these subsidies in the TAR would be 
directly or indirectly destined to the railway construction and heavily concentrated in state-owned units, whereas 
in Qinghai, subsidisation seems to have been more successfully diversified across productive sectors and 
infrastructure projects, and across various forms of ownership. 
59 For instance, in the mid-1990s, when almost every province of the country managed to reverse the increase in 
the ratio between urban and rural household incomes that had been taking place throughout the reform period, 
this ratio in the TAR increased dramatically, entirely departing from the national norm. By 2001, this ratio had 
almost reached six in the TAR (urban incomes six times rural incomes), whereas it was just below three for 
China on average, and between three and four for most western provinces. The ratios are calculated from the 
rural per capita household income statistics and the rural consumer price indices for each province, compiled 
from the 1985 CSY to the 2002 CSY. This divergence between the TAR and every other Chinese province 
indicates that economic policy in the TAR since the mid-1990s has been heavily urban biased, even compared to 
the rest of China, which is usually noted for its urban bias. Questions remain whether the rural income statistics 
are accurate for the TAR, but the trends in the ratio, rather than the exact measure of the incomes or the ratio, are 
telling. See Fischer (2004) for a detailed discussion of this. 
60 For instance, I was able to observe during field research that a single construction company from Chengdu, 
Sichuan has constructed almost all of the bridges along the Qinghai-Tibet railway. The project in general 
involves a consortium of construction and engineering companies from around the country, many from the 
coastal areas. While this situation is extreme in the TAR, even in Qinghai, Goodman quotes a leading cadre who 
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tend to retain and ‘repatriate’ their profits from the lucrative construction contracts, investing 
them in other national projects rather than in the local economy, whereas locally owned 
businesses tend to invest locally. Similarly, temporary workers also tend to repatriate their 
saved earnings, rather than investing or spending them in the local economy.  
 
As a result, even in the midst of growth, the expansion of opportunities for local unskilled and 
semi-skilled labour has been limited. Although economic activities for the local population 
have increased with the boom, these have been more limited relative to comparable growth 
elsewhere in China and have been mostly concentrated on the lower end of construction work, 
and commercial and service activities, most of which are concentrated in the urban areas. This 
dilemma does not apply to the educated and relatively skilled Tibetans, who fit well into the 
administrative expansion. Notably, over 70 percent of staff and workers in state-owned units 
in the TAR in 1999 were ethnic Tibetans. A large share of this cohort is made up of cadres, 
among which ethnic Tibetans again account for a similar share.61   
 
Furthermore, the residual low skill activities are precisely those which the lower skilled Han 
and Muslim migrants tend to occupy as they arrive to take advantage of the subsidised 
bonanza, as opposed to the higher skilled Han staff and workers who are mainly arriving on 
temporary managerial and technical postings. Thus the clash of the two lower-skilled flows – 
local rural migrants (together with the urban poor) and out-of-province ‘spontaneous’ 
migration – essentially takes place over the residual activities left over from the unproductive 
boom, which in turn reinforces the population conflicts referred to above. Competition from 
the incoming migrants, who generally possess higher skill levels than the local population and 
are emigrating from more competitive areas of China, increases the scarcity of opportunities 
faced by local Tibetans. This dilemma is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that urban poverty 
rates and urban household incomes among permanent urban residents in the TAR (mostly 
Tibetan) were both among the highest in the country by the end of the 1990s.62 
 
Employment and migration 
Urbanisation is again central to this scenario. Agriculture, as elsewhere in western China, is 
currently very limited in its capacity to absorb surplus rural labour, let alone to increase per 
capita rural incomes, and there is little scope for rural industries in the Tibetan areas given the 
extreme dispersion of the population. This implies that local rural to urban migration should 
play a central role in development.  
 
This conundrum can be easily summarised by looking at GDP to labour share ratios. These 
ratios show the relative productivity of labour within each sector, in terms of its value-added 
contribution to GDP. This in turn illustrates the underlying economic dynamics that drive 
structural change within the society and economy, and in particular, urbanisation. Table 4.1 
below presents the labour share of each sector in the TAR, Qinghai, and China, while Table 
4.2 shows the GDP to labour share ratios. The secondary sector includes mining, industry and 
                                                                                                                                                        
admits, “In the end the eastern enterprises may benefit more from the development of Qinghai’s infrastructure 
[than the province itself]” (Goodman, 2004, p. 12). 
61 TSY, 2000, table 4-5. Although many of these would be attached to state-owned enterprises, the very limited 
role of secondary industry in the TAR would imply that most of such staff and workers would be in 
administration, commerce, services or construction. 
62 For instance, urban TAR incomes in 2001 were the seventh highest in the country, neck and neck with coastal 
provinces such as Fujian and Jiangsu. The poverty measures are taken from Athar Hussain, ‘Urban Poverty in 
China: Measurement, Patterns and Policies’, InFocus Programme on Socio-Economic Security, Geneva: 
International Labour Office, January 2003. See Fischer (2004, pp.48-54) for more discussion on urban income 
and poverty in the Tibetan areas. 
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construction. The three last columns of Table 4.2 show the ratio of the ratios, that is, the 




Table 4.1: Labour shares (2001) 
 Primary Secondary (M+I+C) Tertiary 
TAR 71.8 % 6.5 % 21.7 % 
Qinghai 60.0 % 13.0 % 27.0 % 
China 50.0 % 22.3 % 27.7 % 
Source: 2002 CSY, table 5-3 
 
 
Table 4.2: GDP/Labour share ratios  
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Sec/Prim. Tert/Prim. Sec/Tert. 
TAR 0.38 3.57 2.30  9.39 6.05 1.55 
Qinghai 0.24 3.39 1.55 14.13 6.46 2.19 
China 0.30 2.29 1.21  7.63 4.03 1.89 
Source: CSY 2002 tables 3-1 and 3-9; table 4.1 above. 
 
Across China, the GDP/labour share ratio is highest in the secondary sector. This means that 
the relative GDP contribution of one worker in this sector, in money terms, is considerably 
higher than in the tertiary sector; more than double in Qinghai, almost double in China, and 
just over one and a half times in the TAR. The GDP or value-added contribution essentially 
includes wages and profits and thus the high secondary and tertiary ratios in the TAR in part 
reflect high salary levels, particularly in the tertiary sector.63 Compared to the primary sector, 
the secondary sector is over seven times more productive in China, over nine times in the 
TAR, and over 14 times in Qinghai. Comparing the tertiary sector to the primary sector, 
tertiary activities are four times more productive than primary in China, six times in the TAR, 
and almost six and a half in Qinghai. The huge gaps with the primary sector undoubtedly 
drive the differences in potential remuneration across the three sectors.  
 
These ratios demonstrate the importance of expanding employment in the secondary and 
tertiary sectors for local agricultural labour in the Tibetan areas, or else for the local urban 
unemployed. While this precedent exists throughout China, with increased relevance in the 
interior and western provinces, it applies even more so in the Tibetan areas, typified by the 
TAR and Qinghai. Productivity in the rest of China, although unbalanced, is more evenly 
distributed across the three sectors, even in other western provinces.  
 
The irony is that expansion in the secondary and tertiary sectors in the Tibetan areas has 
tended, at least in part, to be absorbed by out-of-province in-migrants, both skilled and 
unskilled, rather than migrating rural labour or the urban poor. Even where in-migrants are 
temporary, their circular flow assures a continual replacement, and the population structure of 
the in-migrants, as discussed previously, amplifies considerably their employment impact, 
                                                 
63 More precisely, it is a combination of labour remuneration, depreciation on fixed assets, net taxes on 
production, and operating surplus. See CSY (2002), table 3-10. In the TAR average salaries and wages of staff 
and workers in 2001 were almost double the national average, third highest in the country and just behind those 
of Beijing and Shanghai (CSY, 2002, table 5-20). This reflects the enormous wage incentives that go into 
attracting skilled labour to the TAR, also reflected by the fact that over two thirds of the TAR GDP is composed 
of labour remuneration, whereas in China labour remuneration is on average no more than one half of GDP, and 
fifty to sixty percent in most other western provinces (CSY, 2002, table 3-10).  
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which is concentrated in the urban economy. This would explain why their presence is so 
contentious. In particular, local working Tibetans are faced with some of the highest 
dependency ratios in the country, whereas in-migrants have almost no dependents, at least not 
with them, and most are employed, because otherwise they would go home.  
 
Thus, while the Han might only represent about six percent of the provincial population 
according to the 2000 census, and about one third of the city population and about twenty 
percent of the town population, they represent a much larger share of urban employment than 
their population share would suggest. For instance, assuming that 75 percent of this 2000 
census Han population of the TAR was working, and that they were working mostly outside 
agriculture, their six percent population share becomes more than a one-third share of non-
agricultural employment in the province (both urban and rural). Thus the impact of a net 
increase in in-migration, which appears to be the case since the mid-1990s, would have 
considerable reverberations in non-agricultural employment at this stage of the population 
transition.  
 
In other words, the thesis that the Han are swamping the Tibetan areas is effectively an 
expression of the crowding out effect that such in-migration creates in the local urban 
economy, particularly at a stage when urban opportunities are so critical for the urbanising 
rural Tibetans. Undoubtedly, there is a skills deficit in the region, particularly for the current 
large-scale projects that dwarf the local economy, and the upper range of skilled labour is 
definitely required for the province, so long as such projects persist. In any case, migrating 
rural labour is not competing for such positions, but rather, for the low skill opportunities that 
are opening up in the wake of the construction and commercial boom. Therefore, the level 
playing field between migrants and locals becomes an issue of competition within these 
activities. Given that migrants enter with considerably higher education and skills, the level 
playing field is inevitably slanted to their side.  
 
Education as a proxy for skill levels 
Within this economic context, education and skill levels become the critical factor 
determining inclusion or exclusion. This is in contradistinction to the urban-rural divide that is 
emphasised by most authors.64 Both the urban-rural divide and the proportion of Tibetans 
with secondary education and above – and thus part of the skilled labour force – slices a 
similar 15:85 ratio across the Tibetan population. Nonetheless, the two are not equivalent, as 
there are rural residents with university education and many urban residents who are illiterate. 
Rural Tibetan residents with secondary education and above are able to compete and integrate 
in the modern economy with relative ease. It does not appear that they face any particular 
discrimination in employment or remuneration once they have achieved such an education 
level, unlike many other cases of ethnic discrimination, including possibly that of the Uyghurs 
in Xinjiang. The education divide rather than the spatial divide is therefore much more 
relevant in determining exclusionary outcomes. Accordingly, ethnic discrimination would be 
best identified through differences in the provisioning of education across majority and 
minority ethnic groups, although such an analysis is not the scope of this current paper.65  
                                                 
64 For instance, see Brian Sautman & Irene Eng, ‘Tibet: Development for Whom?’, China Information, XV:2 
(2001), pp. 20-74. 
65 Again, see Fischer (2004) for a more detailed discussion of this. Despite the push towards higher primary 
enrolments in the TAR, per capita education infrastructure (schools and teachers per 10,000 population) at the 
primary, secondary and vocational levels remains significantly undersupplied compared to other areas of western 
China, including Qinghai. This is most notable at the secondary and vocational levels, where skills formation is 
most significant for local labour competing in commerce and services. Ironically, the TAR has an above 
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The skills imbalance between locals and interprovincial migrants in the Tibetan areas is best 
portrayed by interprovincial comparisons of education levels, expressed as illiteracy rates or 
else as the proportion of the population with education above a certain level. Five provinces 
suffice for this comparison. Sichuan is the main source of immigration to the TAR and also a 
significant source to Qinghai. Gansu is also another important source for Qinghai, and 
Shaanxi represents the administrative centre of gravity for Qinghai. Education indicators in 
these three provinces and the national average therefore give a broad indication of the skill 
levels in the sources of emigration to the Tibetan areas, both urban and rural. Illiteracy or no 
schooling would usually imply few skills beyond subsistence agriculture, basic trades or 
localized commerce. The primary level is the focus of current literacy campaigns,66 although a 
person with only primary education can at best be considered low or semi-skilled. Significant 
skills formation starts to take place at the secondary and vocational levels and beyond.  
 
Obviously, as pointed out in much migration research, migrants often have higher levels of 
education than the average in their source communities. For instance, Iredale et al. found that 
education levels among both minority (mostly Tibetan) and Han migrants in Lhasa in the mid-
1990s were significantly higher than their respective places of emigration, although the rates 
between the two groups were vastly disparate.67 Nonetheless, the source levels of education 
can reflect the general culture of education and skills that the migrants have been influenced 
by, are leaving from, and maintain networks with throughout the course of their migration. 
And while there are obviously some migrants with very low or no levels of education, the 
rates of educational attainment should be seen as probabilities (i.e. the chance that a sampled 
person has such and such a level of education).  
 
Table 5: Illiteracy rates among the population aged 15+ (2002 population survey) 
 Rural Town City Total Rural/City 
TAR 49.0 % --- 35.6 % 43.8 % 1.4 
Qinghai 33.6 % 13.3 % 9.6 % 24.8 % 3.5 
Gansu 26.4 % 9.0 % 5.5 % 21.1 % 4.8 
Sichuan 18.0 % 10.8 % 6.4 % 13.6 % 2.8 
Shaanxi 19.3 % 10.5 % 5.9 % 15.6 % 3.3 
China 15.0 % 8.7 % 5.7 % 11.6 % 2.6 
Source: CPSY 2003, tables 1-18, 1-19, 1-20, 1-21. 
 
The exceptionally high level of urban illiteracy in the TAR is remarkable – almost three 
quarters the rural rate, which in turn was already exceptionally high for China. This might 
help to explain why urban poverty in the TAR was among the highest in the country. 
Everywhere else in China, including Qinghai, city rates were only a small fraction of rural 
rates and usually within a close range of the national average city rate. If the data were drawn 
                                                                                                                                                        
national-average supply of tertiary education infrastructure and thus represents a classic bottleneck scenario 
between the primary and tertiary levels. These factors would at least partly explain the low educational 
attainments of Tibetans in the TAR. 
66 Current education campaigns in China aim to achieve one hundred percent primary enrolment and the eventual 
completion of the nine-year compulsory education, which includes the junior secondary level.  
67 This becomes apparent when compared to the census and survey results. The two surveys that Iredale, Bilik & 
Wang (2001) analyse – one in 1996 and another in 1997 – found that 43.8 percent of the minority (Tibetan) 
sample was illiterate or quasi-illiterate with no schooling, while 5.1 percent of the Han sample was illiterate (p. 
156). Both rates were considerably lower than the respective rates in the late 1990s, which were around 60 
percent for the 15+ age group in the TAR and around 15 percent nationally for the same group. For instance, see 
CSY (2000), table 4-8.  
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from early surveys, the comparison would be even more extreme.68 As discussed previously, 
the annual surveys on population changes are based on the permanently residing population, 
and thus this urban sample in the TAR would be mostly composed of Tibetans, given that 
more than half of the Han in the census were temporary residents.69  
 
In the face of these local rates among Tibetans in the TAR, out-of-province migrants – who 
are not captured by the TAR population surveys – would be best described by the rates of 
Sichuan, which are very similar to those of Shaanxi and Gansu. The most extreme comparison 
is between the city illiteracy rates of Sichuan and the rural rates of the TAR, which is 
appropriate given that many of the Sichuanese emigrate from urban or peri-urban conditions 
while indigenous urbanisation in the Tibetan areas by definition involves Tibetan migration 
from the rural areas. In this case, the rural TAR rate of 49 percent contrasts appallingly with 
the city Sichuan rate of 6.4 percent. Interestingly, Iredale et al. measure a similar spread 
between Tibetan and Han migrants in Lhasa in the mid-1990s.70 Yet even in the least extreme 
comparison, rural migrants from Sichuan are on average half as illiterate as the TAR city 
residents, at rates of 18 versus 36 percent illiteracy. Thus even an average rural Sichuan 
migrant in Lhasa would have a considerable skills advantage over the average city resident, an 
anomaly that is simply not observed elsewhere in China.  
 
In Qinghai, there is a sharp difference between the rural rate, which is the second highest in 
the country, and the city and town rates, which are closer to the national norm.71 This 
essentially reflects the contrast between the urbanised and nationally oriented northeast corner 
of the province and the rest of the province, which remains quite impoverished. Nonetheless, 
much of the immigration into the Tibetan areas of Qinghai is intraprovincial, deriving from 
the core cities and towns of the province. On the other hand, Qinghai Tibetans were over 91 
percent rural in the 2000 census and are best captured by the rural rates. In this perspective, 
the disparity between urban and rural rates in Qinghai is equivalent to the comparison 
between Sichuan and the TAR.  
 
This analysis corroborates more generally with the education levels among populations aged 
six and older. Above the primary level, 72 an additional notable feature is the sheer drop off at 
the secondary level in the TAR, with Qinghai and Gansu performing below the national level. 
This indicates that not only is the TAR highly illiterate, but skilled labour is also in extremely 
short supply, with only 13 percent of the TAR population having some form of secondary 
education or higher, versus 39 percent in Qinghai, 43 percent in Sichuan and 52 percent 
nationally (Table 6).  
 
                                                 
68 In the 2001 survey, illiteracy in the TAR was estimated at 44.2 percent in the cities and 46.2 percent in the 
rural areas, i.e. almost identical (CPSY, 2002, tables 1-18, 1-19, 1-20, 1-21). 
69 This can be indirectly deduced by the fact that Public Security Department sources put the non-military Han 
population of the TAR at about 70,000 in 1999, which has remained unchanged throughout the 1990s, whereas 
the 2000 census counted 160,000. The Public Security Department probably uses a definition that is similar to 
the surveys, i.e. permanent and long-term categories of residence (TBS, 2000, 33). 
70 For instance, Iredale, Bilik and Wang (2001) found that 43.8 percent of their minority (Tibetan) sample in 
Lhasa was illiterate or quasi-illiterate with no schooling, versus 5.1 percent of the Han migrant sample in Lhasa 
(p. 156). 
71 The rural rates in Qinghai used to be closer to the TAR rural rates, but in recent years they have been dropping 
more rapidly than those of the TAR, perhaps due to the much better supply of per capita education infrastructure. 
See Fischer (2004) for a more detailed discussion of the supply of education infrastructure. 
72 The proportion of the population with primary education and above is obviously the inverse of the no-
schooling/illiteracy rates 
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Table 6: Education levels including and above various levels, 6+ population (2000 census)  
 No-schooling73 Primary Secondary Tertiary 
TAR 46.4% 53.6% 12.7% 1.5% 
Qinghai 23.6% 76.4% 38.6% 3.6% 
Gansu 16.9% 83.1% 39.9% 2.9% 
Sichuan 8.7% 91.3% 42.7% 2.7% 
Shaanxi 8.1% 91.9% 53.2% 4.5% 
China 7.7% 92.3% 52.3% 3.8% 
Source: CSY 2002 table 4-12 (from the 2000 census). Note that primary includes the category of literacy classes, 
secondary includes junior and senior middle schools, and specialized secondary schools, and tertiary includes 
junior college, university, and post-graduates.  
  
However, the above provincial data does not differentiate ethnicity. Fortunately, the most 
recent population yearbook does divulge education levels by ethnicity from the 2000 census, 
presented in the table below, although these data are not further subdivided by province. They 
nonetheless provide several additional insights (Table 7).  
 
Table 7: Education levels including and above various levels by ethnicity, ages 6+, 2000 census  
 No-schooling Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Total 7.7% 92.3% 52.3% 3.8% 
Han 7.3% 92.7% 53.4% 3.9% 
Tibetan 45.5% 54.5% 13.3% 1.4% 
Tu 18.8% 81.2% 34.6% 3.6% 
Hui 15.6% 84.4% 44.9% 4.1% 
Salar 42.9% 57.1% 17.5% 1.6% 
Dongxiang 58.0% 42.0% 8.4% 0.4% 
Yi  21.2% 78.8% 22.3% 1.1% 
Qiang 8.2% 91.8% 33.9% 2.3% 
Uygur 8.8% 91.2% 35.3% 2.7% 
Mongolian 7.2% 92.8% 54.8% 5.2% 
Source: CPSY 2003 table 2-2. 
 
First, the education levels of all Tibetans are almost identical to those of the TAR – slightly 
more at the primary and secondary levels and slightly less at the tertiary level – despite a 
more than doubling of the head count. This would indicate that education levels among 
Tibetans outside the TAR are essentially the same as inside the TAR. In terms of no-
schooling rates, these education levels were the worst among the large ethnic groups in China, 
and the fifth worst among the ent ire set of 56 ethnicities.74 
 
The poor education performance of Muslim groups specific to the Qinghai-Gansu region is 
also revealing. The national Hui Muslims recorded a medium education level compared to the 
other large groups despite their visible minority status (i.e. lower than the Han but higher than 
                                                 
73 Illiteracy and no schooling appear to be treated synonymously as the two terms are used interchangeably from 
year to year in the Yearbook sources.  
74 The Moinba and Lhoba took second and fourth last places respectively. These are two miniscule indigenous 
groups of the TAR that are closely related to the Tibetans, with populations of less than 10,000 people. The 
Baoan, an equally miniscule group indigenous to Qinghai, won third last place. 
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the Yi). However, the Hui are spread out over the country and these figures probably do not 
reflect their education levels close to the Tibetan areas.75 On the other hand, the Salar are 
almost entirely concentrated in Qinghai and share much in common with the Qinghai Hui. 
Nationally, they were sixth worst in terms of no schooling and their education levels were 
only marginally higher than the Tibetans, as indicated above. These results are especially 
significant given that the Muslims in Qinghai are considerably more urbanised than the 
Tibetans, and thus in principle they should have a better and higher quality access to 
education. The Dongxiang, another Muslim minority concentrated mostly in Gansu had by far 
the worst education levels of the country.  
  
These findings confirm the observations made by many scholars that Muslims in the Qinghai-
Gansu region face significant social exclusion, despite their popular status as being crafty in 
commerce. Evidently, there is strong inequality within this community, such that the region 
produces both very successful Hui and Salar businesspeople as well as an undereducated 
population. These outcomes may themselves be signs of exclusion. For instance, land in the 
Hualong HAC in Qinghai is considerably degraded, which combined with a relatively rapid 
population growth among the Hui and limited off- farm employment opportunities, would put 
a strong downward pressure on the per capita incomes of those households that rely on solely 
farming. This in turn would contribute to high inequality given that the richer segments of the 
Hui community would nonetheless be well integrated into commercial activities in the core 
towns and cities of Qinghai. 76 Also, lack of publicly funded culturally sensitive education, 
which for the Muslims would include some form of religious education in sexually segregated 
classes,77 also contributes to low education outcomes among the poorer members of the 
community. 
 
Conflict between Tibetans and Muslims in the Qinghai-Gansu region therefore represents 
frictions between two marginalized ethno-religious groups. Tibetans nonetheless claim that 
they are economically disadvantaged in the towns compared to the more urban and 
commercial Muslims. The Muslims who do venture into the Tibetan areas are likely to hail 
from the wealthier sections of the Muslim community given that their activities are usually 
integrated into larger Muslim commercial networks. Their presence would thereby entail a 
more competitive pressure than the average Muslim would imply. On the other hand, 
Muslims complain that Tibetans are given special treatment by the authorities, especially in 
TAPs and TACs where Muslims represent a significant visible minority. Yet both 
communities possess equally miserable education levels, particularly after five decades of 
public education under the CCP. 
 
As a final note, the figures above reveal an additional insight into differences between 
Tibetans and other ethnicities in Western China. For instance, the Uygur, almost entirely 
                                                 
75 Many of the Hui are found in Central China, and although their education indicators compare favourably to 
minorities concentrated in the west, they lag significantly behind Han rates in the central and coastal areas. 
76 Given the land tenure system in China, landlessness is not observed as it is in other parts of Asia, but the small 
size of landholdings nonetheless makes sustenance difficult for households based solely on agriculture. Thus 
rural inequality in China is largely determined by access to off-farm employment, with the exception of coastal 
or suburban farming that is specialized in certain high-value crops. For instance, see the work of Khan and 
Riskin (2001). This rule applies even more in the arid western areas, such as the Hualong HAC, where the land is 
considerably degraded and the cultivation of high-value crops limited. The same principles would apply to the 
Tibetan areas, except that their populations are much more dispersed than in the Muslim areas of Haidong, and 
less urbanised and less involved in commerce. Thus manifest extremes of inequality are less visible in the 
Tibetan areas.  
77 For instance, see Goodman (2004), p. 13.   
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concentrated in Xinjiang, face an entirely different scenario from the Tibetans. They are in 
fact a relatively well-educated ethnic group, with close to national average illiteracy rates, 
although they fall behind at the secondary level and above. Therefore, where ethnically 
defined exclusion of Uygurs occurs, this may result from more overt forms of discrimination, 
whereas given the exceptionally low levels of education among Tibetans, exclusion can easily 
occur without overt discrimination necessarily playing a role per se. On the other hand, many 
forms of implicit discrimination contribute to the poor education indicators in the first place.78 
This inference is similar to the observations made earlier in terms of net population inflows.  
 
In contrast, Mongolians are among the best-educated ethnicity in China, with higher 
education levels than the Han, particularly at the tertiary level. 79 The Tu in Qinghai also have 
much better levels than other ethnicities in the province, perhaps due to the fact that their 
population is concentrated close to the core northeast corner of the province. For similar 
reasons, the Qiang in Sichuan, who mostly reside in a few counties of the Aba Tibetan-Qiang 
AC that are relatively close to Chengdu, also have reasonable education levels, comparable to 
the Uygurs. Nonetheless, all of these minority groups, with the exception of the Mongolians 
and possibly the national Hui, experience a significant gap with the Han at the secondary level 
and above, which is precisely where skills formation becomes most relevant.  
 
 
Reflections on Ethnic Conflict in Light of Transition and Exclusion 
In light of the experiences of Tibetans within growth and urban expansion, it is possible to see 
contemporary interethnic conflict, also centred on the urban areas, as in part a defensive 
reaction to exclusion and other ills of modernity. Ethnic nationalist discourses that identify 
outsiders as dominators or aggressors, be they voluntary or not, could be understood as efforts 
by locals to negotiate more inclusive forms of development with the state and the dominant 
ethnic group. This is not entirely instrumental, for it includes a normative aspect that locals 
consider legitimate, i.e. to counteract the perceived and actual effects of exclusion. Inversely, 
it also aggravates historical conflicts between groups, albeit within the entirely new context of 
the emerging urban space.   
 
The ethnic nationalisms that underlie conflict therefore present a double-edged sword, given 
that they carry the ir own inclusionary and exclusionary dynamic. The inclusive relates to the 
integration of the dominant minority – Tibetans – into the hegemony that the Han wield over 
state- led development. The exclusive relates to other minority groups that are in competition 
for state patronage. In other words, nationalist movements under various guises or political 
positions can act to promote local ‘ownership’ of the development process while at the same 
time showing a repressive, sectarian or xenophobic face to other ethnic groups, or even to 
other competing factions of Tibetans. This danger is particularly pronounced for the Muslims 
                                                 
78 For instance, the per capita supply of education infrastructure at the primary and secondary levels in the TAR 
appears to be considerably lower than both national averages and other western provinces, despite the fact that 
the TAR has one of the youngest populations of China (2002 CSY, tables 4-3, 20-27/29/30/31/32; 2000 
Tabulation, table 2-5). See Fischer (2004) for more detail. Other factors of implicit discrimination could include 
the political uses of education, culturally insensitive education policies, and so forth. For an excellent discussion 
of many of these issues, see Catriona Bass, Education in Tibet; Policy and Practice since 1950. London: TIN/Zed 
Books, 1998. 
79 However, this would not necessarily apply to the Mongolians of Qinghai. Nonetheless, it appears that the 
Henan MAC in Qinghai has a fairly strong primary and secondary education policy, as observed during a field 
visit in the summer 2003. For instance, they have apparently convinced most pastoralists to send their children to 
boarding schools in the county town, whereas this remains a problem in many Tibetan pastoral areas.  
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in Qinghai given their vulnerability. Because they do not represent the agency of the state, 
they can become easy targets of aggression.  
 
Scepticism might be raised about the possibilities for a Tibetan- led push towards more 
inclusive forms of development within the Tibetan areas given the Han-dominated one-party 
framework of Chinese politics. Yet in light of the fact that over 70 percent of the staff and 
workers in state-owned units in the TAR are ethnic Tibetans, including government cadres, it 
is possible to conceive that such an ethnic elite could play a similar role within a 
‘corporatist’80 or ‘topocratic’81 Chinese setting that nationalist political parties play within 
procedurally democratic settings. This would particularly be the case where Tibetans and 
related Mongolians and Tu increasingly manage to jostle themselves into a position of junior 
partner in the local prefectural and county governments of their autonomous areas.82 
 
From this perspective, the Han in the Tibetan areas are not necessarily the targets most in 
danger from emergent Tibetan nationalism. This is not only because the Han maintain 
hegemony of state power and represent an overwhelming adversary in terms of both 
economic and military strength. It also relates to the fact that, beyond the high profile 
animosity of recent history, there is a certain common ground between the two cultures that 
ultimately provides a fertile soil for mutually beneficially interaction. This has become more 
apparent as the religious and cultural traditions of the Han also re-emerge in the reform 
period. In their interface with Tibetan Buddhism, there is increasingly more space for 
consensual forms of cooperation between Tibetans and Han based on mutually understood 
symbols and practices. Accordingly, many conflicts within the Tibetan areas increasingly tend 
to revolve around competition between groups of Tibetans vying for state or patron favour, or 
else disagreements among Tibetans over the degree and nature of cooperation with the Han or 
                                                 
80 A variety of different political economy theories of a corporatist lineage have been developed to explain 
localized developmentalism within the Chinese polity. For instance, for some of the most prominent, see Marc J. 
Blecher, ‘Developmental State, Entrepreneurial State: The Political Economy of Socialist Reform in Xinji 
Municipality and Guanghan County’ in G. White (ed.), The Road to Crisis: The Chinese State in the Era of 
Economic Reform, London: Macmillan, 1991; Marc J. Blecher & Vivienne Shue, Tethered deer: government 
and economy in a Chinese county, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996; Jean C. Oi, ‘Fiscal reform and the 
economic foundations of local state corporatism in China’, World Politics, 45:1 (1992), pp. 99-126; Victor Nee, 
‘Organizational dynamics of market transition: hybrid forms, property rights and mixed economy in China’, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 37 (1992), pp. 1-27;  Dorothy J. Solinger, China's transition from socialism: 
statist legacies and market reforms, 1980-1990, Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1993; Susan H. Whiting, Power 
and wealth in rural China: the political economy of institutional change, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001. 
81 See Terry Canon, ‘Introduction: The Economic Reforms, Demographic Processes and Environmental 
Problems’, in Terry Cannon (ed.), China's Economic Growth: The Impact on Regions, Migration, and the 
Environment, London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 2000, pp. 1-29. Drawing off the corporatist theories, he innovates 
the terms ‘topocracy’ or ‘bounded localized development’ to describe the crucial role played by locally bound 
jurisdictions in the processes of decentralization and devolution that underlie the Chinese growth experience of 
more than two decades. He differentiates his concept from corporatism in that his embraces various hierarchies 
of locality-bound jurisdictions and applies to both successful and unsuccessful cases. The former corporatist 
analyses tend to only consider the county levels of government, mostly in the successful coastal counties.  
82 From discussions with one researcher working in the area, it seems that the Hui were the favoured junior 
partner in the in late-Maoist years and early reform years. The Hui, with networks throughout northwest China, 
were more integrated into national politics and offered no separatist threat, unlike the Tibetans or Uyghurs. Since 
the 1990s, it seems  that this favouring may have reversed, with suspicion of Islam counterbalancing a newfound 
popularity for Tibetans among the Han. 
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the extent to which Han outsiders may interfere with the internal affaires of the Tibetan 
community. 83 
 
In contrast to this somewhat strained potential for co-existence, both Tibetans and Han sit 
comfortably with similar prejudices towards the Muslims, who are scapegoated for a variety 
of social problems, such as increasing crime. Even a successful Muslim businessperson may 
be typically characterised as tricky or a cheater.84 The trend seems to point in the direction of 
increased ostracism of Muslims from both sides, leaving them much more vulnerable than the 
Han to outbursts of Tibetan violence. An apparently local Amdo Tibetan saying bears 
evidence of this prospect – mie hui qu han – which means “kill the Hui and kick out the 
Han”.85  
 
Again, there are two possible strands to such a conflict. One is straightforward historical 
enmity. The second is the defensive social reaction in response to disadvantaged competition 
faced in the towns. In this respect, the Muslims again attract attention because they compete 
in the same low-skill commercial and service activities that, in principle, would be the key 
entry points into the urban economy for urbanising Tibetans. Yet ironically, local Muslims 
also find themselves sandwiched between the Han and Tibetans. Despite their often-noted 
success and craftiness in business,86 it appears that many of the poorer Hui and Salar are 
bearing the brunt of social exclusion in the lowlands as well as increased reticence in the 
highlands.  
 
In this sense, contemporary conflict in the Tibetan areas can be viewed in terms of the 
position of each group within the intensified integration of these peripheral regions into a 
national framework. Conflicts between Tibetans and Han generally revolve around related 
consolidation efforts. Conflicts between Tibetans and Muslims deal with competition between 
two marginalized local groups over the residual spoils of this peripheral integration, and with 
the struggles to manage exclusion within the context of social and economic transformations. 
Both types of conflict include historical and modern aspects. Local conflicts that were rooted 
in the past have transmuted alongside modernity, responding to tensions that are entirely 
contemporary to the post-1950s, such as rapid population growth, urbanisation, urban-centred 
growth or consolidation of state hegemony over ‘frontier’ regions.  
 
 
                                                 
83 This carries a very interesting parallel to conflicts within aboriginal communities in Canada and the US 
between modernisers and traditionalists, although the associations of co-optation are not necessarily identical in 
each case.  
84 Derived from conversations with a variety of Tibetans and Han along with several other scholars working in 
the area. A similar scapegoating of the Yi takes place in Sichuan, where both Tibetans and Han typically 
characterize them as thieves without religion, in contradistinction to the Tibetans, a noble civilisation possessing 
religion. When I countered that there were many renowned bandits among the Khampa Tibetans, both Tibetan 
and Han interlocutors argued that when a Khampa robs you, he does so facing you in an act of bravery, whereas 
the Yi do so in a sneaky way from behind. 
85 One scholar working in Qinghai quoted this saying to me in Chinese. I  have not yet had the chance to find it in 
Tibetan. From my own side, I have come across many surprisingly racist attitudes towards Muslims among both 
Tibetans and Mongolians, whether newcomers in the exile community or residents in the Tibetan areas in Ch ina. 
86 For instance, Goodman (2004) points out that two of Qinghai's wealthiest entrepreneurs are Muslims, one a 
Salar from Xunhua County, and another a Hui from Hualong County (p.13). Interestingly, Goodman 
concentrates on this common perception that Muslims in the region have been successful and appears to 
overlook the issue of social exclusion, despite much evidence pointing to the wider Muslim experience of 
marginalisation.   
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Conclusion 
Tibet is a society in transition, as are all developing societies. Yet symbols of the political 
debate become transfixed in a perpetual image of an old pre-transitional time (Shangri-La). 
Ironically, the exile discourse is basically urban-centric in its analysis of the Tibetan areas, 
although it rests on the conviction that Tibetans are essentially a rural people. While this 
process of identifying rurality with Tibetans and urbanity with Chinese is an accurate 
portrayal of the current population status quo on the plateau, it nonetheless overlooks 
important developmental issues faced by Tibetans during the course of their population and 
economic transitions. These revolve around issues of exclusion from urban development and 
the urgent need to improve the integration of Tibetans into their urban areas, despite the fact 
that this might dilute their more traditional characteristics. Tibetan urban areas are the focus 
of inter-ethnic contestation precisely because of their centrality to contemporary social and 
economic developments.  
 
More generally, although the Shangri-La imagery emphasises the more exceptional and 
unique aspects of the Tibetan areas, they nonetheless exhibit a fairly normal pattern in terms 
of social exclusion and ethnic conflict in peripheral regions. In particular, this study draws 
attention to the centrality of population transitions, especially with regard to differential rates 
of urbanisation, and their interactions with growth, employment and differential skill levels in 
determining group-based exclusion as well as interethnic conflict. These insights could be 
applied to many comparable peripheral multi-ethnic settings of the developing world, thereby 
serving as a valuable contribution to the ongoing research agendas of exclusion and conflict. 
 
Furthermore, these dynamics appear to be related to the intensified integration of peripheral 
regions into core regions, in a process that is analogous to ‘globalisation’, defined in a similar 
manner. During such intensified integration, peripheral growth is increasingly driven by 
levers that are based outside the local economy, which in turn creates a centripetal dynamic 
that diverts the benefits of growth to the core regions, such as Chengdu, Chongqing or the 
coastal areas. Economic activity becomes concentrated in larger regional or national entities 
that are not based in the local economy and that are unresponsive to local skill levels, local 
networks, and so forth. Smallholder agriculturalists and the urban poor become marginalized 
as they face increasingly high hurdles to participate in the dynamic sectors of the economy, 
which are dominated by the logistical and strategic priorities of the core areas. Polarised 
growth therefore tends to generate exclusionary outcomes, most manifest in the urban areas. 
This would explain the emergence of high urban poverty even in the midst of rapid growth 
rates.  
 
In this context, ethno-nationalist discourses evolve in both a normative and instrumental 
manner. The normative responds to the manifestations of exclusion and potentially serves as 
an organisational basis around which palliative and inclusive strategies can be advocated. 
This works in tandem with the instrumental as a means used by the ethnic elite to at least 
partially re-appropriate the economic levers of the local economy. Yet such discourses also 
carry an exclusionary element, based on reinforcing ethnic divisions. This aspect is 
accentuated by the exclusionary nature of growth in such peripheral regions, which leads to 
increased tension between groups, particular between minority groups that compete over the 
residual lower-skill activities in the economy. These groups bear the brunt of exclusion due to 
their lower education and skill levels and their marginalisation from political and economic 
power. The potential for both exclusion and conflict is heightened when migration is added to 




The danger arising from such a scenario is that one minority group may scapegoat another in 
their struggle to adjust to the changing na ture of political and economic power in these 
regions. This represents the conundrum faced by Muslims in the Tibetan areas, who have 
some of the poorest social indicators in the country, comparable to the Tibetans, yet are faced 
by comfortably shared prejudices from both the mainstream Han Chinese society and the 
dominant Tibetan Buddhist minority communities. In other words, even Shangri-La has its 




Amdo The indigenously defined region of northeast Tibet, which is currently 
subdivided between Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan.  
Chinese Muslims (i.e. Hui, Salar, etc.)  
The term ‘Chinese Muslims’ is often used to differentiate these Muslims, who 
are racially close to the Han Chinese, from the Turkic Uyghur Muslims of 
Xinjiang. The dominant group among the Chinese Muslims are the Hui, who 
are spread throughout the country and are actually quite diverse. Nonetheless, 
an important concentration of Hui is based in the region that surrounds Amdo, 
split into three northwest provinces – the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, 
Gansu, and the northeast corner of Qinghai. The Hui population in this 
northwest region is supplemented by several other small Chinese Muslim 
groups, such as the Dongxiang in Gansu and the Salar in Qinghai. This paper 
will refer to Chinese Muslims as Muslims and the Uyghur Muslims as Uyghurs. 
Han This paper uses the official terminology for ethnicity in China. Thus Han are 
the ethnicity commonly referred to as Chinese, whereas Chinese is accepted as 
a term that designates citizenship within the Chinese nation. It is acknowledged 
that this definition is sensitive among minorities because it implies that 
Tibetans or Uyghurs are Chinese. Nonetheless, here Tibetans will be simply 
referred to as Tibetans, and for clarification, sometimes the Han will be referred 
to as Han Chinese.  
Kham The indigenously defined region of eastern Tibet, which is currently subdivided 
between the TAR, Sichuan, Yunnan and Qinghai.  
TAC Tibetan Autonomous County, the lower level of autonomous status, 
incorporated into prefectures. Other minority autonomous areas are similarly 
designated, such as HAC for Hui Autonomous County, TMAP for Tibetan-
Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture, and so forth. 
TAP Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, the higher level of autonomous status given to 
Tibetan (and other ethnic) areas outside the TAR and incorporated into the 
other four provinces containing Tibetan areas, namely Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan 
and Yunnan.   
TAR Tibet Autonomous Region, the provincial- level jurisdiction that the Chinese 
often refer to as ‘Tibet’ but that encompasses less than half of the traditional 
Tibetan areas. The boundaries of this region were more or less determined by 
the territory controlled by Lhasa in the first half of the 20th century. 
Utsang The indigenously defined region of Central Tibet. U is the area around Lhasa 
and Lhoka, the main seat of the Dalai Lamas, whereas Tsang is the area around 
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